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FOREWORD
Grand strategy is an important subject. It is about 
the dialectical relationship between power and com-
mitments, ends, and means. Grand strategy concerns 
not only the alignment of resources with goals, but 
how to conceive those goals in the first place. At root, 
it is about the identity of the security community. 
What kind of country does it want to be, and what 
kind of country does it have the power to be?
Debating U.S. grand strategy is a difficult subject 
in the public domain. First, it is often a reductionist 
debate. The author of this monograph contends that 
the overwhelming consensus among the two political 
parties is that Americans should focus on how to pre-
serve America’s liberal hegemony, in which the world 
is ordered under American leadership and domi-
nance in order to secure its institutions and values at 
home. Dissent from that agenda, the author argues, 
is often dismissed too quickly as narrow isolationism. 
He observes that America does not have to choose 
between dominating the world and hiding from it. 
Instead, he asks how can Washington best remain a 
heavyweight among other heavyweights? He raises 
a Second important point: critics of America’s liberal 
hegemony need to think harder about how alterna-
tives should be designed and implemented, and what 
trade-offs, costs, risks, and dilemmas they would 
generate. He worries that too much collaboration and 
“pullback” could lead to a dangerous vacuum occa-
sioned by regional rivalries and spirals of insecurity. 
Finally, he concludes that too much competition could 
lead to avoidable clashes between America and states 
bidding for regional dominance. Like Goldilocks’s 
bears, it might be time to think about getting the mix 
“just right.”
This monograph is a small but important step in 
that direction. It does not offer a single blueprint, but 
constructively suggests a logic through which a new 
strategy could be hammered out, and some concrete 
ways in which new problems could be mitigated. 
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this 
monograph as a contribution to the national security 
debate on this important subject.
   
   DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
   Director
   Strategic Studies Institute and
      U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The Pax Americana and the grand strategy of 
hegemony (or “Primacy”) that underpins it may be 
becoming unsustainable. Particularly in the wake of 
exhausting wars, the Global Financial Crisis, and the 
shift of wealth from West to East, it may no longer 
be possible or prudent for the United States to act 
as the unipolar sheriff or guardian of a world order. 
But how viable are the alternatives, and what dif-
ficulties will these alternatives entail in their design 
and execution? This analysis offers a sympathetic but 
critical analysis of alternative U.S. National Security 
Strategies of “retrenchment” that critics of American 
diplomacy offer. In these strategies, the United States 
would anticipate the coming of a more multipolar 
world and organize its behavior around the dual prin-
ciples of “concert” and “balance,” seeking a collabora-
tive relationship with other great powers, while being 
prepared to counterbalance any hostile aggressor that 
threatens world order. The proponents of such strat-
egies argue that by scaling back its global military 
presence and its commitments, the United States can 
trade prestige for security, shift burdens, and attain 
a more free hand. To support this theory, they often 
look to the 19th-century concert of Europe as a model 
of a successful security regime and to general theories 
about the natural balancing behavior of states. This 
monograph examines this precedent and measures 
its usefulness for contemporary statecraft to identify 
how great power concerts are sustained and how they 
break down. The project also applies competing theo-
ries to how states might behave if world politics are in 
transition: Will they balance, bandwagon, or hedge? 
This demonstrates the multiple possible futures that 
could shape and be shaped by a new strategy. 
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A new strategy based on an acceptance of multipo-
larity and the limits of power is prudent. There is scope 
for such a shift. The convergence of several trends—
including transnational problems needing collabora-
tive efforts, the military advantages of defenders, the 
reluctance of states to engage in unbridled competi-
tion, and hegemony fatigue among the American 
people—means that an opportunity exists interna-
tionally and at home for a shift to a new strategy. 
But a Concert-Balance strategy will still need to deal 
with several potential dilemmas. These include the 
difficulty of reconciling competitive balancing with 
cooperative concerts, the limits of balancing without 
a forward-reaching onshore military capability, pos-
sible unanticipated consequences such as a rise in 
regional power competition or the emergence of blocs 
(such as a Chinese East Asia or an Iranian Gulf), and 
the challenge of sustaining domestic political support 
for a strategy that voluntarily abdicates world leader-
ship. These difficulties can be mitigated, but they must 
be met with pragmatic and gradual implementation 
as well as elegant theorizing and the need to avoid 
swapping one ironclad, doctrinaire grand strategy 
for another.
1SHARING POWER?
PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. CONCERT-BALANCE 
STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION
America’s time as the undisputed hegemon of 
the world might be coming to an end. For better or 
worse, the United States has been the unipolar super-
power presiding over a world system it, in large part, 
designed. Thanks to a range of interlocking prob-
lems, a growing number of observers now argue that 
the security environment of the early-21st century is 
becoming inhospitable to the kind of dominance that 
Americans were used to. Nothing is certain, and pre-
vious similar prophecies have turned out to be prema-
ture. Nevertheless, the decline of America’s relative 
power and the end of unipolarity is now a sufficiently 
possible scenario as to warrant a serious debate about 
alternative grand strategies and an alternative role in 
the world. 
In turn, this has serious policy implications for 
America’s Landpower, its amphibious forces and 
their forward deployment abroad. America’s land 
forces have been used to deter and respond to hos-
tile states, and as a constabulary of sorts in pacifying 
countries against subversive guerrillas. These respon-
sibilities have played a role in shaping the identity of 
America’s land forces. To debate U.S. grand strategy 
is to debate what the country should do with its Army 
and Marines, how large and expensive they should be, 
and indeed what they are even for. 
But if not American hegemony . . . what? Short of 
either “coming home” or holding on to hegemony, is 
there a viable grand strategy to be found somewhere 
2in the middle? Can the United States prudently carve 
out a role between an overreaching primacy and the 
insularity of a “waters edge” policy? Just as impor-
tant, how should the policy be pursued? If the circum-
stances today make it prudent to begin retrenchment 
of America’s commitments, on what theoretical basis 
should it be pursued? This monograph addresses 
these questions. 
If we are seeing the coming of a more multipolar 
world, America’s most realistic aspiration is to steer 
its way to becoming a primus inter pares among other 
rising states. This analysis weighs the prospects of an 
alternative strategy based on the logic of sharing pow-
er. It is written from the perspective of an Australian 
who is both reassured by and uneasy with the Barack 
Obama administration’s reaffirmation of its alliance 
with Canberra, signaled most visibly by the arrival of 
U.S. Marines in Darwin. For Australia’s sake as well 
as America’s, it would be wise for the great powers 
to avoid two grave scenarios. The first would be an 
escalating Sino-American rivalry and even a clash 
that would place Australia in the crossfire between 
the country’s main security provider and its main eco-
nomic partner. The second would also be dangerous—
a complete U.S. withdrawal followed by an escalating 
rivalry between states such as China, Japan, and India, 
which would make for a poorer and more dangerous 
neighborhood. 
If tomorrow’s world will bring a redistribu-
tion of power internationally, then the only prudent 
path is to examine how the great powers could learn 
to live together and keep the peace, while retaining 
the capacity to thwart any would-be aggressor. That 
would mean the United States making a way to some 
extent to accommodate and allow for the rise of other 
3states with a different grand strategy. That strategy 
would involve some combination of offshore balanc-
ing and great power concert, a mixture of cooperation 
and hedging that accepts renewed multipolarity as a 
fact of international life and looks to shape rather than 
control world politics. As argued here, both strategic 
history and a survey of future possible scenarios sug-
gest that this may be difficult. But a difficult course in 
which America hopes for the best and prepares for the 
worst is better at least than an impossible one (hold-
ing on to the Pax Americana) or an irresponsible one 
(withdrawal and isolation).
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I lays 
the competing grand strategies on the table, describ-
ing the critiques of current U.S. strategy and the 
arguments and theoretical underpinnings of pro-
posed alternatives. It argues that multiple crises have 
exposed the serious imbalance between the resources 
and goals of current strategy. This section suggests 
that for all its adjustments, the Obama administra-
tion is working within the overarching grand strategy 
it inherited. 
Part II introduces an under-recognized problem, 
namely, that even if U.S. primacy is no longer sustain-
able or prudent, other strategies may also entail seri-
ous dilemmas that have not been fully appreciated. 
These include the problem of unintended geopoliti-
cal consequences, the dangers of both balancing and 
bandwagoning behavior, the military presence prob-
lem, and the domestic politics problem. This section 
examines the historical precedents for collaborative 
security regimes, such as the 19th-century concert of 
Europe, arguing that while such strategies can succeed, 
they also are finite and must cope with the inherent 
difficulties of balancing competition and cooperation 
4and sustaining international and domestic consent. 
Four converging trends are proposed to make pos-
sible a sober reappraisal of America’s position and a 
shift to a new Concert-Balance role: the undesirabil-
ity of unbridled competition, the military advantages 
held by defenders, transnational problems requiring 
collaborative efforts from the great powers, and hege-
mony fatigue among the American people.
Part III suggests how a new strategy could deal 
practically with the problems of design and imple-
mentation. It shows the different models of Concert-
Balance and what they would entail, many of which 
are highly territorial in their emphasis. Each of these 
models would directly affect America’s land forces, 
whether reducing and pulling them back entirely, or 
redeploying them within vital regions. As argued, it 
would probably be most prudent to balance the ben-
efits of a partial withdrawal for the sake of conceding 
strategic space to rising states, with the benefits of a 
regional presence (including land forces in reserve) 
for the sake of retaining the capacity to deter and 
check any power that is not interested in sharing. Land 
forces conceivably would be part of this strategy. The 
ability to capture and hold territory would remain a 
part of deterrence and defense, even if new weapons 
technology profoundly raises the costs of doing so. 
Importantly, the author also proposes that a more col-
laborative grand strategy could be built partly on the 
basis of nonterritorial measures. It is not just a case of 
drawing geographic lines and arguing where to place 
forces, but a matter of managing interstate relation-
ships in their entirety—for example, through arms 
control, measures to reduce the chances of accident 
and misperception, a refocusing on areas on which the 
states agree (such as energy security), and stepped-up 
5diplomacy. I argue that for the strategy to have lon-
gevity and consent, elegant theorizing is less impor-
tant than compromise, gradual pacing, and the patient 
building of domestic support. While this monograph 
will not prescribe any single blueprint, it identifies the 
trade-offs that a pragmatic shift in strategy will have 
to negotiate.
PART I: THE STATE OF STRATEGY
This monograph presents an argument about U.S. 
grand strategy. The subject of grand strategy—what 
it is and to what ideas and historical models America 
can turn—is getting renewed attention from the aca-
demic and policy communities.1 Grand strategy is the 
orchestration of ends, ways, and means in a context 
of actual or possible armed conflict, in the long haul 
and between peace and war. It is a theory of how 
to pursue national security and ensure a way of life 
by aligning power with interests.2 Grand strategy is 
the management of a chain of relationships among 
means and ends on many levels, an elusive effort to 
link these disparate things together. Strategy is thus 
distinct from both policy (the desired outcome) and 
operations (the exercise or use of the tools or the rela-
tionship between ways and means, such as the con-
duct of military campaigns). It is best conceived not 
as an identifiable actor or “thing,” but as the bridge 
that fuses or relates them all together.3 Grand strat-
egy represents the highest political realm in which 
these relationships are conceived. It aims at shaping 
an external environment in which the community’s 
political institutions and values, its territorial integ-
rity, and its way of life can be secure. It is for the long 
haul, eyeing the experience of security communities 
6across generations. Within this big picture, conflict is 
seen not simply as a matter of victory and defeat, but 
judged according to proportional cost and long-term 
consequences. To strategize is to relativize. Through 
the lens of grand strategy, what seems like a bad 
military failure or withdrawal can be a prudent cut-
ting of losses. An expensive diversion of resources 
by one generation can be a valuable investment for 
the next.
After its emergence as a superpower in the middle 
of the 20th century, the United States pursued a grand 
strategy of Primacy, or Hegemony. It is still debated 
precisely when this grand strategy was conceived 
and settled. Some strategists point to the thinking 
and calculations made during World War II, predat-
ing America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union (1947-
89). Its main principles were laid down in a Brookings 
Institution study of 1945, endorsed by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.4 This study argued for the prevention of any 
hostile powers or coalitions dominating the Eurasian 
landmass. Others argue that America’s grand strategy 
under its new President, Harry Truman, was initially 
fluid, but between 1945-53 it solidified into an overarch-
ing project, with the Korean War acting as a catalyst.5 
Others yet argue that even after the Cold War intensi-
fied, the Dwight Eisenhower administration still held 
out hopes for the recrudescence of Europe as a third 
force and nuclearized counterweight to the Soviet 
Union—a Europe onto which the United States could 
shift some of the burden—and that it was only with the 
John Kennedy administration that America finally set-
tled on uncontested primacy as its preferred status in 
the world.6 
Whenever historically it was established, the pre-
dominant strategy was as follows: Often described as 
the Pax Americana, or euphemistically as “leadership,” 
7this strategy was the pursuit of unchallengeable pri-
macy by a nation that sees itself as the guardian of 
world order. It aims well beyond overcoming adver-
saries. It seeks to secure the United States and its way 
of life by spreading a democratic and market ideology 
that remakes the world in America’s image. By becom-
ing the anchor of world security, the United States 
attempted to forestall the re-emergence of a multipo-
lar world of competitive power politics. By preventing 
any one power from dominating vital regions in West-
ern Europe or East Asia, the United States could pro-
tect its interests throughout the world.  Consequently, 
the United States looked to break the cycle of destruc-
tive power politics of the Old World, by harnessing its 
raw material power and exercising it through a new 
world order based on an architecture of international 
institutions designed by Americans. America looked 
to deter or overmatch enemies, reassure friends and 
potential rivals, and remain the sole benevolent 
superpower, with its domestic liberalism secure in a 
liberal globe. 
This strategy has, as its interlocking parts: dissua-
sion, (to prevent potential rivals from challenging it); 
reassurance (to act as guarantor, underwriting the 
security of allies and partners to persuade them not 
to pursue military self-reliance that could create rival 
power centers); coercive nonproliferation (to prevent 
the spread of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction 
[WMD] capability); and especially with the “[George 
W.] Bush Doctrine,” anticipatory war and muscular 
democracy promotion. This strategy implements this 
through a global military presence organized through 
a chain of bases; a network of permanent alliances 
and client states; and a pervasive spying and surveil-
lance system—all underwritten by the Bretton-Woods 
8financial order and the dollar as the world’s reserve 
currency. More than interventionist in the world 
beyond its water’s edge, it amounts to an “enduring 
intrusion.”7 This grand strategy was not unbroken and 
continuous. In the interlude under President Richard 
Nixon (1968-74), America attempted to transition to a 
more balance-of-power system, with burdens shifted 
to allies and regional clients (like the Shah’s Iran). But 
Primacy eventually reasserted itself.8 
The Pax Americana was both a grand strategy and 
an American self-image. It lived on beyond the Cold 
War  and the demise of America’s principal adversary, 
the Soviet Union. After that struggle, the United States 
reaffirmed its grand strategy of Primacy. This was laid 
down in the Pentagon’s leaked Defense Planning Guid-
ance draft in 1992,9 and reaffirmed in successive offi-
cial National Security Strategies. 
Makers of American strategy may disagree on the 
methods and temperament of statecraft, but mostly 
agree on the ends. Across both major political parties, 
it is a consensus that America should strive to remain 
the unchallengeable hegemon securing itself by 
extending market-democracy globally, with the debate 
focusing on how this is best done. Should America 
be consensually multilateralist or more unabashedly 
unilateralist, to what extent should it legitimize its 
power through international institutions or retain a 
free hand, and how much and where should it use its 
military power? These are not trivial questions, but 
they are mostly questions of technique, which are con-
tested within a fundamentally shared grand strategic 
outlook. Successive administrations may believe that 
they are making a fundamental departure from their 
predecessors, but objectively may still be following 
the same broad assumptions. The Bill Clinton admin-
9istration of 1993-2001, for example, purported to shift 
America from “Containment” to “Enlargement”—
while President Clinton privately doubted whether 
grand strategy was even useful or desirable—but it 
objectively continued the project of former presiden-
cies in a new, post-Cold War context, namely preserv-
ing and extending American hegemony by expanding 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), wag-
ing two wars in the Balkans, and at one point militar-
ily confronting China over Taiwan.10 
What now? The age of American-centric uni-
polarity may be giving way to a more multipolar 
world order. Here I do not seek to assert or refute 
the notion of American decline. There is already a 
vast literature on that contested subject.11 Instead, 
this analysis proceeds on the assumption that a 
nontrivial, major shift in power and wealth may be 
underway from West to East.12 In particular, we may 
be seeing through the rise of both India and China 
the realization of a geopolitical prophecy stretching 
back to Halford Mackinder and rearticulated now 
by Robert Kaplan. That prophecy is the coming of 
the Greater Indian Ocean era—or more accurately, 
the Greater Indian-Pacific era—becoming the pivotal 
arena of global politics because of its abundance of 
natural resources, its linkage of increasingly wealthy 
and growing states, and its critical position astride 
sea lanes.13
The change that may be underway does not neces-
sarily mean that America is destined to fall but that 
the distribution of power and wealth in the world may 
bring an end to the era of the Pax Americana. That is, 
the shift of economic and then strategic weight to Asia 
may constrain America’s capacity to dominate the 
international system and shape global events as it did 
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since the fall of its major adversary in 1989-91. This 
shift is not absolute; it could be reversible and nonlin-
ear. The United States, for its sheer size and resources, 
its sophistication in science and technology, its cul-
tural appeal, and its battle-hardened military power, 
is likely to remain a strategic heavyweight for gen-
erations to come at least. Pound for pound for combat 
power, for example, in the area of naval aviation, the 
United States is without peer and will be for decades 
at least. Nothing is guaranteed, prophecies of decline 
have been wrong before, and we should not rule out 
a renaissance in America’s global position.14 Poten-
tial challengers could also implode, and in the fields 
of natural resources, internal politics, and economics, 
China has its own profound internal fractures, vulner-
abilities, and tensions. America’s rivals cannot afford 
the United States to wane too much, given the reliance 
of export-oriented economies on the appetite of Amer-
ica’s import market as the consumer-in-chief, and 
given China’s own reserves of U.S. Treasury Bonds. 
That said, all world orders come to an end eventually. 
It would be foolish to dismiss the prospect of a power 
shift now because predictions were wrong in the past. 
Such a power shift is sufficiently possible to cause a 
deeper debate about what kind of alternative strate-
gies would be most prudent. Soberly to imagine and 
prepare for a future in which America may no longer 
be the only superpower is simply to be realistic. 
The status quo of the Pax Americana is unsustain-
able, at least in its current form. A mounting debt (at 
present it has reached $16 trillion), record deficits, and 
competing demands on dwindling resources present 
a brute reality: that the United States probably cannot 
go on as the sole guardian of world order in the way 
in which it has been accustomed.15 Indeed, the pres-
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sure on public finances in itself constitutes a threat to 
the security of Americans’ way of life. The Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified record debt as 
the greatest threat to national security; the Director of 
National Intelligence warns that the economic crisis 
is America’s gravest security peril; and former Secre-
tary of Defense Robert Gates warned that the United 
States could become what President Eisenhower 
feared, “militarily strong, but economically stagnant 
and strategically insolvent.”16 Dauntingly, Washing-
ton is faced with the need to restore its financial sol-
vency, protect the dollar’s reserve status, and meet its 
growing debt and interest payments, while also meet-
ing growing obligations to a retiring population. This 
means it must make difficult “guns or butter” choic-
es about cutting spending, especially discretionary 
spending, on defense.17 This would force the United 
States to choose between hollowing out its existing 
military or scaling back its commitments and mis-
sions for a reduced force to accomplish. These prob-
lems have grown over decades, but could metastasize 
quickly.18 America faces a “Lippmann Gap,” in which 
its commitments exceed its power.19 The self-defeating 
behavior of fiscal indiscipline, accelerated by the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, has saddled the nation with 
a range of domestic and international commitments 
that it struggles to uphold.20 
Under these circumstances, holding onto the exist-
ing strategy—Primacy—would be unwise. It “forces a 
state to defend a vast and brittle Perimeter.”21 In addi-
tion to making America’s commitments exceed its 
resources, Primacy carries the “free rider” problem, 
of some allies and partners over-relying on Washing-
ton to shoulder the burden of their defense (such as 
some European NATO allies have long done). It car-
12
ries the “moral hazard” problem of unintentionally 
underwriting the risky behavior of others by guaran-
teeing their protection. It potentially places the United 
States on a fatal collision course with other emerging 
powers, plunging both sides into a security dilemma 
whereby the measures they take to enhance their own 
security undermine other actors’ positions and make 
them feel insecure, both then entering a spiral of dis-
trust, competition, and arms buildup. Primacy can 
present the temptation of preventive war. An attempt 
to forestall the power shift through direct competi-
tion with emerging powers, even through preventive 
war, would be dangerous. Not only would it place 
the United States in conflict with states on whom it 
depends economically, but historically, preventive 
wars are launched to keep other states down, whether 
by Wilhelmine Germany or Imperial Japan, and tend 
to accelerate the very power shift they aspire to pre-
vent.22 These wars can drive economies backward and 
turn regions into antagonistic camps. One significant 
cost of American primacy is entanglement in the poli-
tics of the Gulf, which played a nontrivial role in galva-
nizing the al-Qaeda terrorist network and its war with 
America as the “far enemy” for its role in sponsoring 
the hated “apostate regimes.”23 In times of abundance, 
these problems possibly are manageable as an accept-
able cost of a grand strategy. But America’s strength 
is now strained to the point that it lacks the surplus 
reserve of power to respond to the contingent emer-
gencies that its current course may produce. 
The case for retrenchment of America’s commit-
ments, therefore, is compelling. Retrenchment is the 
retraction of grand strategic commitments in response 
to a decline in relative power, reducing the costs of 
foreign policy by redirecting resources away from 
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peripheral to core commitments.24 It would involve 
some combination of the following: redefining inter-
ests and more strictly ranking core versus periph-
eral ones in order to reduce commitments; shifting 
burdens to allies and raising their contributions to 
their security interests; cutting military expenditures; 
avoiding militarized disputes and peripheral wars 
and reducing threats to interests through diplomacy; 
and devising cheaper and more effective forms of 
power and strategies for their use. A new grand strat-
egy, however, would require more than making even 
major adjustments. It would be premised on a change 
in an underlying ethos from the accumulation of 
power and dominance of the international system to 
power-sharing, balance, and watchful accommodation 
within it.
Power shifts make new conflicts possible, but not 
inevitable. Conflict is not a law in periods of power 
transition, as some more pessimistic realists seem to 
think. Power transitions can be managed peacefully, 
as in the case of the Dutch Republic giving way to 
Britain in the 1700s. As we will see, historically from 
time to time, states have willingly formed concerts or 
regimes, agreeing to limit competition and co-exist 
warily. There is scope for discretion and choice as 
some states rise and others fall, passing each other on 
the way.25
If conflict during major power transitions is not a 
law, it is still a tendency.26 If history is a rough guide, 
as rising states like China become more wealthy and 
powerful, we should expect them to become more 
assertive in pressing their interests. Status quo powers 
(such as the United States) may well feel threatened, 
and are tempted to flex their muscles to tame their 
world back into equilibrium. We may already see the 
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evidence for the propensity to increasing confronta-
tion, for example, in the harder line states that are 
taking on maritime territorial claims in the South and 
East China Seas; in Washington’s embrace of India 
as a strategic partner; and in China’s development of 
a blue-water naval capability, its development of an 
anti-access and area denial shield, and its moderniza-
tion of its nuclear weapons system and development 
of submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. At 
the time of this writing, Beijing has publicly launched 
its first aircraft carrier amidst simmering territorial 
disputes with Japan, over the Senkaku (or Diaoyu) 
Islands in the East China Sea and with the Philippines 
and Vietnam over resource-rich parts of the South Chi-
na Sea.27 In addition to the contest for relative material 
power, prestige is part of the issue. China appears to 
be a dissatisfied state in the sense that its power is not 
yet sufficiently expressed internationally; its historic 
humiliations by foreigners have not yet been expi-
ated; and its true status is not yet reflected through its 
historic frontiers in Taiwan, India-Tibet, or the South 
China Sea.28 
In a different context, with its main neighboring 
adversary, Saddam Hussein, taken off the board, an 
increasingly influential Iran regards itself as a natural 
great power in the Gulf. It is not as obvious a candi-
date as China to be a revisionist challenger, as it does 
not have the engine of a powerful economic expan-
sion to underpin its bid for power and lend legitimacy 
to its regime. Nevertheless, the Gulf, like East Asia, 
is a region open to the effects of power transition. 
We are already seeing signs of renewed balancing 
against Iran, with the Arab Spring adding a potent 
revolutionary dimension to competition as Saudi Ara-
bia and Iran compete in a Cold War contest in which 
popular protest and sectarian conflict endanger their 
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client regimes and in which both throw their military-
financial weight into contested areas like Bahrain 
and Syria.
In this possibly deteriorating environment, how 
could alternative grand strategies be designed and 
implemented? The most prudent course would be 
to identify a middle-ground strategy somewhere 
between the poles of Primacy and Isolation. In terms of 
its first-order interests, the United States is essentially 
a materially secure state due to its distance, the pow-
er it can project to repel aggressors, its large nuclear 
stockpile, and the costs in the present era of waging 
offensive war and attempting conquest. The security 
of the United States need not depend on remaking 
the world in its image. But the United States still has 
nontrivial second-order interests in the security of the 
world’s energy supply, the sea lanes and chokepoints 
such as the Straits of Malacca or the Straits of Hor-
muz, and  in shaping the balance of power in critical 
regions, such as the Persian Gulf and in East Asia. As 
the U.S. maritime services argue, interests in the secu-
rity of the global commons mean that it needs to have 
credible combat power in critical areas of the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans.29 The United States still exerts 
influence and helps set the agenda partly by virtue 
of its presence beyond its own shores. These interests 
and influences may not be strictly existential. But they 
are still serious. 
So on what logic should a middle-ground strat-
egy be based? U.S. grand strategy has attracted many 
overlapping efforts at categorization. It is difficult in 
all this taxonomy to identify and distinguish what 
really differentiates one from another.30 The debate on 
grand strategy is also mixed up in debate over making 
strategy in discrete conflicts, such as the Cold War or 
the Global War on Terror.31 
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For our purposes here, I identify three broad logics 
that could inform future strategy, those of Primacy, 
Isolation, and Concert-Balance.32 If we could plot 
alternative grand strategies on a spectrum, a Concert-
Balance type would lie somewhere in the middle, 
between the poles of continued global domination 
and abandoning power politics and “coming home.” 
It would relinquish hegemony as gracefully as pos-
sible, but remain engaged as a heavyweight willing to 
assert itself. 
What exactly is a Concert-Balance Strategy, and how 
does it differ from other strategies? A Concert-Balance 
strategy would concede strategic space and spheres of 
influence to other states, reduce America’s peripheral 
commitments, contract the defensive perimeter and 
the military footprint, and perhaps exchange formal 
permanent alliances for informal temporary ones—
while asking other states to show reciprocal restraint 
and to contribute more to maintaining regional stabil-
ity and security. The proponents of this strategy have 
formulated it in different ways. Michael Lind, Hugh 
White, and Stephen Van Evera lean more toward the 
concert side of the equation, proposing that the United 
States arrange a negotiated coexistence with emerg-
ing powers, while remaining present to some extent 
in vital neighborhoods such as East Asia or the Gulf.33 
In what could be the next pivotal geopolitical region 
of the world, some propose (with varying confidence) 
a concert of Asia.34 
Alternatively, offshore balancing theorists (such as 
Christopher Layne, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, 
and Stephen Walt)35 place more stress on the infor-
mal process of burden shifting and pulling back from 
America’s forward commitments, and look to regional 
powers to check and balance against each other, with 
the United States as the “balancing” security guaran-
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tor of last resort. Only if one state were to achieve a 
preponderance of power and dominate its neighbors 
would the balancer fully intervene. In the words of 
Layne, offshore balancing “would define U.S. interests 
narrowly in terms of defending the United States‘ territo-
rial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hege-
mon” in an increasingly multipolar world.36 These theo-
rists are probably more pessimistic about the chances 
of successfully building a concert, seeing international 
life as overwhelmingly competitive. In their view, the 
United States can live with continual power struggles, 
so long as they do not produce dangerous concentra-
tions of power. 
The premise of these alternatives is that America’s 
most prudent course is to accept and accommodate 
what the writers see as a fact of political life, the return 
of multipolarity. The underlying logic of Concert-Bal-
ance grand strategies is that of watchfully sharing power 
with other major states, as a more sustainable way 
of securing America’s way of life. As Michael Lind 
argues for the marriage of both principles of concert 
and balance:
The Concert-Balance strategy represents the best 
national security strategy for the United States in an 
era of emerging multipolarity and domestic budget 
constraints. It abandons the exorbitantly expensive 
and ultimately doomed attempt to forever forestall 
the emergence of other great powers by means of dis-
suasion of potential foes and reassurance of friends, 
in order to realistically prepare for the U.S. role as a 
leader of concerts and alliances in a multipolar world. 
It draws both on American idealism—the dream of 
collective security shared by Woodrow Wilson and 
Franklin Roosevelt with millions of people around the 
world—and on American pragmatism—the successful 
experience of the United States during the World Wars 
and Cold War as a leading member of great-power 
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alliances rather than a solitary superpower. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the United States has lacked a 
credible vision capable of guiding American national 
security policy in the multipolar world of tomorrow 
without bankrupting the economy or exhausting pub-
lic support. The Concert-Balance strategy provides that  
missing vision.37
Pulling back and limiting U.S. liability would per-
suade other states to shoulder a greater burden of 
counter-hegemonic balancing. As America does less, 
others would have to do more. At the same time, the 
United States can disengage from formal Eurasian 
commitments and make significant budget cuts with-
out compromising national security. 
However, in addition to attempting to negotiate a 
coexistence with other major powers, America with 
this strategy would also seek to cover its bets in case 
other states turn out to be bad sharers. It would thus 
husband its military-strategic capabilities and accu-
mulate surplus power to counterbalance against any 
would-be aggressor, and act as a security provider of 
last resort. Taking Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler’s 
triptych of transcender, mitigator, and fatalist visions of 
world politics, a Concert-Balance strategy falls prey 
neither to the hopes of utopians who seek to transform 
the world, nor to those fatalists who see international 
life as an inherently conflictual, predatory, and zero-
sum game. It holds that insecurity can be ameliorated 
for a time and that conflict can be limited and local-
ized, but that the mischief of the anarchic world can 
never be finally eliminated.38 
This strategy does not rule out intervention or the 
use of force, but remains “at heart a watching and reac-
tive strategy, not . . . a precautionary and preventive 
one.”39 Its ultimate goal is not to prevent war outright, 
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but to ensure that any conflict minimizes costs and 
maximizes gains for U.S. relative power. Strategists 
who take the above positions do have their differ-
ences. Where they implicitly or explicitly differ is how 
this new strategy should be operationalized, what 
bargains would need to be struck to make a concert 
work, and what moving “offshore” means in practice. 
The final chapter of this work will identify and weigh 
these differences.
What historical models would inform this kind of 
grand strategy? There are cases in international his-
tory that can give a rough guide to what collaborative 
regimes and power balancing look like, even while 
they are imperfect analogies.40 Crucially, each case 
has its drawbacks. The record suggests that effective 
retrenchment and the adoption of a new grand strat-
egy is possible, but that in practice active balancing is 
hard to pull off without entanglement and unintend-
ed consequences. For their part, security regimes are 
impermanent, they rely on a level of power equality 
that does not always exist, and their very success con-
tains the seeds of their failure.
From U.S. history, there are some ruthless exam-
ples of balancing behavior. By limiting and delaying 
its intervention in the European war of 1939-41, the 
United States was able to help keep Britain and the 
Soviet Union in the war while the two continental 
giants—Germany and the Soviet Union—were worn 
down, preventing both from becoming masters of Eur-
asia. As a result, America emerged as a nuclear super-
power and the only state that directly materially ben-
efited from the most destructive war in history. The 
change in power relativities as a result of World War 
II left America’s might artificially high in 1945.41 The 
United States experienced unprecedented industrial 
expansion. It reached the highest per capita produc-
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tivity in the world, the highest standard of living, and 
domination of the world's gold reserves. The United 
States also became the largest creditor and exporter. 
Its capacity to project power globally with long-range 
bombers and carrier task forces was unparalleled, 
leaving formerly great powers such as Britain (whose 
empire it helped dismantle) and France in security 
dependency on Washington. We must note, howev-
er, that this is still a violence-based example. Such a 
strategy still led to full-scale mobilization and a vast 
military effort, a precedent that some find discour-
aging as a model for future grand strategy making. 
Similarly, one precedent for offshore balancing is the 
backing of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a counterweight 
to revolutionary Iran, a bloody strategy that had 
mixed results—containing a potential regional hege-
mon and preserving a power balance in the Gulf, but 
entangling the United States in an ongoing forward 
deployed presence and a decade of containment. This 
strategy also taunted the United States with complic-
ity in one of the most catastrophic wars in the region 
in modern times. This is again a precedent that will 
cause disquiet for some observers.
History also offers some less violent diplomatic 
precedents in which overstretched states have found 
effective diplomatic ways of reducing threats, shifting 
burdens, and realigning with former adversaries, all to 
close the gap between their power and their commit-
ments. One is Edwardian Britain at the turn of the 20th 
century. In the wake of the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-
1902, Britain found itself overextended and facing 
the rise of Imperial Germany as an economic power-
house building a large navy and a revisionist state that 
posed a challenge to the Pax Britannica. Furthermore, 
Germany's rising power coincided with that of other 
maritime nations such as Japan and the United States. 
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To adapt to this inhospitable environment, Britain 
conceded strategic space to the United States over its 
own hemisphere in the Americas and the Caribbean, 
allied itself with Japan as a counterweight to Germany 
and Russian expansion in Asia, and conciliated with 
France and Russia.42 This grand strategy on its own 
terms was a pattern of effective strategic adjustment. 
It fell short, however, of overhauling the deep eco-
nomic issues linked to the problem, and it was mostly 
unstated and fragmented. Moreover, by accommodat-
ing or settling with its main imperial rivals, Britain 
helped the encirclement of its most feared continental 
rival, thereby stimulating further antagonism and the 
breakdown of European order. 
American diplomatic history also offers a con-
structive case. Over three presidencies between 1968 
and 1980, Washington opened the way to full diplo-
matic relations with China, reducing potential threats 
to its interests in Asia; it negotiated the Camp David 
Accords and realigned itself with Egypt; resolved 
the Panama question; achieved modest successes in 
persuading allies from NATO to Japan to increase 
their defense budgets; and achieved arms control 
agreements with the Soviet Union on ballistic missile 
defenses and strategic offensive weapons. As Samuel 
Huntington noted, “Consider how different the world 
would look and what the demands would be on U.S. 
resources if China were threatening aggression against 
American interests in Asia, if Egypt were a Soviet 
ally and military base, and if the Panama Canal were 
under intermittent attack by guerrilla-terrorists.”43 As 
a result in large measure of the U.S.-China détente, 
America emerged from the Vietnam War with none 
of its allies straying or its adversaries falling out, and 
with its overall strategic position in Asia bolstered 
rather than weakened. 
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The great historical model for a security regime or 
concert is that of 19th-century Europe, formed in 1815 
at the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napo-
leonic France and its bid for continental hegemony. 
Europe’s concert was a “security regime,” or “geo-
strategic cartel,” of a set of relationships and practices 
designed to build cooperation between the victorious 
states.44 It did not always achieve consensus, or elimi-
nate disagreements or even occasional armed con-
flicts. But its members did cooperate to manage crises 
and prevent a generalized, major international conflict 
between them. It was an impermanent solution. His-
torians dispute the causal relationships that produced 
the stability and relative peace associated with the 
concert, and they dispute the timing and causes of its 
demise. They probably were united around the gains 
from cooperation and the costs for defection, were 
impelled by sheer exhaustion from the Napoleonic 
wars to avoid another major conflict, and may have 
been culturally bonded by shared aristocratic values 
and a sense of an international European community 
of common security interests. 
The 20th century has also seen the recrudescence 
of the idea: The United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) was formed to embed a concert of major 
powers, or in the earlier words of President Woodrow 
Wilson, a “community of power.” Moreover, there are 
echoes of an informal concert in today’s management 
of international order by the leading states—though 
the concert principle reflected in this architecture was 
overshadowed by the dyadic Cold War competition 
between two of its leading members, and ever since 
has been overshadowed by America’s unprecedented 
level of unipolar dominance.45
In defining Concert-Balance strategies, it is impor-
tant to clear up three areas of conceptual confusion. 
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First, offshore balancing is not the same as isolation-
ism. While isolationists might be drawn to some of 
the policy implications of offshore balancing, the two 
approaches are distinct: Both involve abstention from 
foreign military commitments to a greater or lesser 
degree, but balancing strategies in principle allow for 
more of an “over the horizon” presence in the region, 
remain concerned about the balance of power abroad, 
and are not strictly committed as isolationists are 
to neutrality. 
Second, offshore balancing is a grand strategy, but 
is sometimes treated as a matter of tactical/operation-
al military posture and style, an aversion to forward 
deployed land forces or ground military expeditions 
in favor of the standoff ability to punish/interdict 
through naval air strikes. Taken literally, in this con-
text offshore balancing means removing garrisons in 
various regions, and parking the U.S. Navy over the 
horizon to intervene only occasionally. For Robert 
Pape, it entails the use of air and naval assets rather 
than direct occupation.46 For John Mearsheimer, it 
means minimizing America’s military footprint in the 
region while ensuring that no single power dominates 
it, reducing incentives for anti-American terrorism.47 
These proposals in themselves do follow the logic of 
extricating the United States from costly ground com-
mitments, but could just as easily stand as discrete 
measures in maintaining a grand strategy of Primacy 
based on raiding and punitive strikes. Ultimately, 
an offshore balancing strategy must go beyond tak-
ing steps to minimize terrorist blowback and is really 
intended to refocus the United States on what political 
realists regard as the central question of its relations 
with other major states.
Third, contrary to the claims of some, the current 
grand strategy remains one of Primacy.48 The Obama 
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administration has recalibrated U.S. statecraft in some 
significant ways, most notably in the pivot toward 
Asia as its priority, the downgrading of America’s 
commitment to European security, a de-emphasis on 
counterinsurgency and nation-building, and reshap-
ing the military to make it more “standoff” in its 
posture and its missions. Obama is already taking 
some steps at retrenchment as laid out in the Defense 
Strategic Guidance and shifts in its military posture.49 
But in words and deeds, the Obama administration 
is still trying to hold on to American hegemony and 
in particular, primacy in Asia, by bolstering its own 
presence while restraining China’s rise in the Pacific. 
The Defense Strategic Guidance leaves much scope for 
interventionism, even while it has abandoned expe-
ditionary land adventures to pacify and rebuild third 
world countries. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
declared a “new American moment” and reaffirmed 
America’s commitment to global “leadership,”50 
though in a subsequent speech she emphasized U.S.-
Chinese partnership.51 President Obama’s speech to 
the Australian Parliament in November 2011 rededi-
cated the United States to being a Pacific power with 
an enhanced presence in the region—underwriting 
its security and seeking a cooperative relationship 
with Beijing but inviting it into an American-centric 
order.52 In its behavior, the United States augments 
its naval-air presence in Asia and reinforces strategic 
ties with allies in the shape of Marines deployed to 
northern Australia and military assistance to states 
potentially in China’s shadow. The United States has 
also recently consolidated its strategic partnership 
with India, which is probably partly a hedge against 
China’s rise.53 In practice, there is already in the cur-
rent strategy an effort to spread costs by encour-
aging burden sharing, especially in East Asia. But 
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Obama’s statecraft is still highly interventionist, and 
its overall goal is unchallengeable primacy through 
permanent presence.
Under Obama, the United States attempts to pur-
sue the existing inherited grand strategic goal (the 
preservation of American primacy) while adjusting 
the ever-shifting mix of military supremacy, deter-
rence, reassurance, and democracy promotion in an 
apparently increasingly important part of the world 
where economic weight and political ambition are 
moving. The overriding message is that of sustaining 
an American-centric order with little room for strate-
gic parity. In other words, Washington invites China 
to cooperate harmoniously as a stakeholder, from an 
unequal position. This is some distance from a pow-
er-sharing agreement or security regime. Obama’s 
adjustments do not yet represent a fundamental shift 
in America’s grand strategic aims or its underlying 
rationale. Importantly, this is how China perceives 
U.S. strategy, that “Washington wants cooperation 
on its own terms, seeks to deter Beijing from devel-
oping a military capability to defend its interests, 
and intends to promote change in the character of the 
Chinese regime.”54 
PART II: NO FREE LUNCHES: DILEMMAS, 
TRADE-OFFS,  AND OPPORTUNITIES
In grand strategy, as in life, there are no free lunch-
es. An unbending commitment to Primacy may well be 
unaffordable and imprudent. But retrenchment and a 
new strategic role are likely to entail serious costs and 
risks. Here in Part II, I survey the main critical objec-
tions that have been made against Concert-Balance 
strategies.55 These critiques in part are overblown, as I 
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argue. But other aspects of them stick. The more astute 
criticisms should inform and temper how a different 
strategy is conceived, designed, and executed. At the 
same time, the uncertain international environment is 
also throwing up opportunities and trends that could 
work in favor of a change in American statecraft.
The debate about moving the United States into a 
more modest, withdrawn role boils down to a ques-
tion of chaos: How much would its retrenchment or 
withdrawal unleash, and how much chaos can the 
United States affordably live with? It is worth recall-
ing that offshore balancers do not claim to offer a solu-
tion to international insecurity. After all, the strategy’s 
main advocates are pessimistic realists. They regard 
competition and insecurity as hard-wired into the 
anarchic world in which we live. Rather, they seek to 
keep the United States away from the eye of geopo-
litical storms and transfer conflict to others, leaving 
crisis management in the first instance to local states. 
They resist the widespread assumption that interna-
tional security must rest upon the adult supervision of 
a singular superpower, reminding us that for America 
to retrench and burden-shift is not the same as mak-
ing other states defenseless. That is the difficulty 
with Aaron Friedberg’s accusation that retrenchment 
would betray “America’s long history of coming to 
the aid of fellow democracies, a decision that could 
be construed as abandoning some of them to their 
fates.”56 Apart from its selectively rose-tinted view of 
American diplomatic traditions, this argument under-
estimates the capacity of other countries to take on 
a greater burden of balancing and counterbalancing 
themselves. That would be an obstacle to his dark sce-
nario, in which an unchecked Chinese domination of 
East Asia could give it preferred access to, if not full 
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command over, the region’s vast industrial, financial, 
natural, and technological resources, and a base for 
further power projection. Besides, by reducing the 
chances of a security dilemma, an accommodation 
of China’s growth (within limits) that prevented all-
out competition could enhance rather than threaten 
the security of the democracies that Friedberg cares 
about. At the same time, a Concert-Balance strategy 
would reckon that the chances of China slowly politi-
cally liberalizing would be greater if its leaders could 
not easily rally nationalism by claiming that their state 
was being encircled and threatened. 
According to more optimistic appraisals, an Amer-
ican retreat from hegemony would lead to a manage-
able level of strife that would benefit U.S. security 
interests. The withdrawal of America’s military super-
vision would see the re-emergence of natural checks 
against predatory behavior—namely a return to the 
logic of balancing and equilibrium, should any state 
threaten its neighbors. In addition, any competition 
would be limited and bounded by today’s military 
technology. Nuclear weapons have made conquest 
by other states virtually impossible and prohibitively 
costly. They generally dampen security competition 
among major powers. As cooperation is imperative 
and competition increasingly costly, never before 
have there been such strong incentives for interstate 
peace, stability, and cooperation. In this new space, a 
new security regime of collaboration could be forged, 
hammered out, and negotiated with emerging powers 
such as India and China. There are new, transnational 
threats that require joint response and could form the 
basis for a concert. Just as the 19th-century concert was 
bound together by a common fear of mass revolution 
and the wars that attended it, so too could the major 
powers of the 21st century organize and collaborate 
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around the unifying force of common threats such 
as catastrophic terrorism, WMD proliferation, and 
threats to the global commons such as climate change. 
Against this optimistic reckoning, there are darker 
possibilities. A return to a stable multipolar balance 
of power is not necessarily guaranteed. Neither nucle-
ar weapons nor new global threats might suffice to 
prevent the resumption of competition and security 
dilemmas. Even if nuclear weapons do have an over-
all restraining effect and preclude the kind of conquest 
and expansionism that traditional balance-of-power 
strategy fears, states might still engage in security 
competition of other kinds, such as proxy wars, arms 
and alliance races, and high-stakes confrontations. 
Without the world’s sheriff as security guarantor, 
there could be an alarming cycle of distrust, military 
buildup, regional arms races, escalating competition, 
and war in key regional centers such as the Gulf or 
Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, it is not clear that balancing 
will be the dominant response to America’s withdraw-
al. States deprived of American security guarantees 
might “bandwagon” rather than “balance,” aligning 
themselves with regional hegemons rather than coun-
terbalancing them, leading to a Chinese East Asia or an 
Iranian Gulf. These would form the kinds of regional 
blocs that have traditionally been unwelcome to U.S. 
strategists. Even if Concert-Balance theorists are right 
and balancing does prevail over bandwagoning, the 
United States would have to be prepared either to live 
with, or to mitigate, the effects that could flow from 
the withdrawal of America’s reassuring and dissuad-
ing presence. 
What should we make of the objection that shar-
ing power to burden shift will in turn invite security 
dilemmas, as emerging powers re-arm, expand their 
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ambitions, and enter a new era of confrontation? Crit-
ics may be astute to point out that confidence in the 
natural balancing dynamic can overlook the destabi-
lizing effects of creating power vacuums that would 
not necessarily directly threaten the United States, but 
still be bad for its interests. As they point out, if the 
United States does less, states may be less confident 
that Washington “has their back.” To switch meta-
phors, if the American cork is then removed from the 
Gulf and Asian bottles, those regions may be in for 
new and dangerous waves of saber rattling and insta-
bility. As two observers put it: 
Forward-postured forces also reassure allies of the 
United States’ commitment to their security. On the 
Korean Peninsula, for example, the presence of some 
28,000 U.S. personnel reminds Seoul that the United 
States stands ready to defend South Korea against 
North Korean aggression. Further south, U.S. naval and 
air forces engaged in Australia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand give allies in Southeast Asia greater 
confidence that the United States will not abandon the 
region at a time of great change and uncertainty.57
But even with the United States still in a forward-
leaning role and Obama’s pivot toward Asia, a rise 
in competition flowing from a sense of insecurity is 
already happening to some extent. The evidence for it 
lies in the pattern of rising defense investment, territo-
rial disputes, and flare-ups. Asian states are already 
spending much more on their defense as they fear 
their security environment deteriorates. According to 
latest findings of the International Institute of Strate-
gic Studies (IISS), Australia, South Korea, Japan, India, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore all raised 
their defense spending significantly over the past few 
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years.58 Apart from the effects of inflation, this can 
be explained as the result of several converging fac-
tors, including uncertainty over the implications of 
China’s rise, doubts over the credibility of U.S. secu-
rity guarantees, and economic growth in East Asia. 
In response, U.S. strategy already contains a mixture 
of security provision and burden sharing. Regional 
states are not waiting for a shift in U.S. grand strategy 
to feel insecure and are actively taking measures to 
help themselves. A dangerous multipolarity may be 
on the horizon, whether America welcomes it or not. 
The strategic choice for the United States is whether to 
resist this development—placing greater strain on its 
overstretched resources and putting it on a collision 
course with other powers—or adjust to and manage 
this change as gracefully as possible. 
There are also practical, logistical, and domestic-
political problems entailed in a Concert-Balance strat-
egy. How is the United States to act as an offshore 
power, intervening selectively to protect the equi-
librium of world order, without the architecture of 
a forward military presence, a basing network, or an 
onshore military capability? Would prudent balanc-
ing from a distance still entail a withdrawal to its own 
hemisphere, or would the United States need to retain 
a basing presence and ability to secure the global 
“commons” on which it depends by projecting power 
over potential flash points or maritime choke points 
such as the Spratley Islands, Taiwan Straits, Straits 
of Hormuz, or the Malacca Straits? Intervening mili-
tarily as a balancer may also be made more difficult 
by innovations such as nuclear weapons, interconti-
nental missiles, and information technologies, all of 
which enable regional defenders to place high costs on 
a would-be offensive interloper. If the strengthening 
of “access/area denial” makes direct intervention too 
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expensive or too escalatory, other problematic forms 
of competition would have to be considered, such as 
bankrolling temporary allies or proxy wars. 
The greatest practical problem with offshore strat-
egies is the concrete need any balancer would have for 
military bases abroad. It is not the case that technolog-
ical sophistication and long-range weapons systems 
remove America’s need for an onshore military capa-
bility. Indeed, ever-more-sophisticated technology in 
some ways is more demanding of physical support 
than its antecedents. Jet fighters, tanks, and helicop-
ters need constant maintenance, fuel, and logistical 
backup. Ship crews need food and harbors. To wage 
war against Iraq in 1991, a relatively weak opponent 
compared to the U.S.-led coalition, the United States 
still had to amass a gigantic quantity of supplies in 
Saudi Arabia.59 Effective military power, especially at 
long range, lies not only in doctrines of force employ-
ment or the volume of firepower, but in the capacity 
to sustain operations. Therefore, any effort to reduce 
America’s security footprint should take into account 
the need to leave regional states confident enough in 
America’s will to act as a balancer that they are willing 
to offer access to bases. 
Balancing from abroad may be more violent, 
more intense, and more entangling than sometimes 
assumed. The major historical example of an offshore 
balancer, 18th-century Great Britain, worked hard to 
stay aloof from continental commitments, but balanc-
ing still led it into a range of European wars including 
that of the Spanish Succession (1701-14), the Austrian 
Succession (1740-48), the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), 
and the War of the First Coalition (1793-97), as well as 
the war against France in the American Revolution-
ary War (1775-83). Then there were proxy struggles in 
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colonial India and in the Vendee uprising, among oth-
ers. For the present, Michael Lind argues that, in the 
absence of unlikely major interstate wars, balancing 
would entail not only the training of indigenous forc-
es or emergency relief, but also “proxy wars” reminis-
cent of the Cold War.60 This would place in jeopardy 
one of the main imperatives of a new grand strategy, 
which should be to involve an overstretched super-
power in fewer conflicts, especially costly peripheral 
ones that do not directly threaten it. 
Another difficulty is the problem of bandwagon-
ing. As Krepinevich argues, a reduced U.S. strategic 
presence may open the way not to balancing, but 
to China’s strategy of “Finlandization,” if Beijing’s 
goal is: 
not to establish its pre-eminence in the region by fight-
ing a war. Rather, the Chinese want to do so by win-
ning a ‘bloodless’ victory, by convincing Seoul, Taipei, 
and Tokyo that, given the altered military balance in 
East Asia, they should accommodate Chinese interests 
and reduce ties with the United States.61 
The risk of a region-wide bandwagoning, histori-
cally speaking, is low, but not remote.62 As we will see, 
Taiwan in fact is consciously Finlandizing. But what 
of India, Japan, or South Korea? For bandwagoning to 
occur, a number of conditions normally are needed. 
States that behave in this way are normally relatively 
weak; they see the dominant state as an appeasable 
threat, and they lack available or potential allies. The 
first criterion may apply to Taiwan, given its proxim-
ity to a powerful neighbor, but the other two apply far 
less to India or Japan. South Korea may be a candidate 
for a partial drift toward Beijing in the event of a U.S. 
withdrawal, but outright bandwagoning would be 
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made less likely by the role of its historic adversary, 
North Korea, also China’s client. In the Gulf, there are 
few regional states powerful enough to predominate 
to the extent that others would be tempted to band-
wagon. Iran’s resurgent influence would still prob-
ably be countered by Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt. 
In the event of a U.S. withdrawal from formal secu-
rity commitments in Eastern Europe, it is not clear 
that states like Poland or the Czech Republic would 
regard Moscow as an appeasable threat. Equally, we 
could reasonably expect a reassertion of Russia’s geo-
political influence nearer its frontiers, with states such 
as Georgia and the Ukraine less confident that the 
United States, through NATO, would have their back. 
Realistically, a power-sharing relationship with Rus-
sia would probably have to concede Moscow strategic 
space in its own backyard. Thus, overall, there may 
be bandwagoning to an extent for more vulnerable 
states that are physically closer to China and Russia, 
but not for a bandwagoning cascade to the extent that 
some fear.
This raises an important point about the role of 
allies and fellow democracies in American grand 
strategy. Effective strategy requires the recogni-
tion of limits, the limits of both power and commit-
ments. To embrace an open-ended commitment to the 
cause of democratic liberty is to abandon limits. Even 
the defense of Western democracy has historically 
involved bargaining and collaborating with authori-
tarian allies, both with Stalinism in World War II and 
with a range of dictatorships in Europe, the Middle 
East, South America, Africa, and Asia during the Cold 
War. Consider, for example, the question of NATO 
expansion and the charge that America might abandon 
its democratic allies to Russia. Russia has an orbit that 
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it will jealously protect, just as America does. Instead 
of flirting with the notion that NATO will draw in 
states in others’ backyards, or even protect them in 
a crisis, it is more prudent to accept that this is just 
geopolitical bad luck for the likes of Southern Cyprus, 
Georgia, or the Ukraine, whose inclusion could draw 
NATO into conflict or give opportunities to secession-
ists or nationalists to manipulate NATO into a crisis. 
NATO is not obliged to do what it cannot prudently 
do, or what it cannot do without taking on suicidal 
risks; in this case, an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation 
on a militarized frontier, or an Article V commitment 
to war with Russia. NATO does not exist to defend 
vulnerable states that live in the shadow of giants or 
to be a crusading Delian league of democracies. It 
exists to protect the North Atlantic world. Part of that 
task is to negotiate distance with outside powers and 
reassure them from a position of strength, rather than 
close the gap and antagonize them from a position 
of overreach.63 
Just as criticisms have been leveled at offshore bal-
ancing strategies, so too has the notion of a security 
regime attracted doubters. Consider the concert of 
Europe as the major case in international history. This 
debate is complicated by the problem that historians 
disagree on what sustained and what undermined the 
concert, and even when we should date its life and 
death.64 But from the balance of the historiography, 
we can confidently assume that such regimes may be 
impermanent and hard to sustain. A successful regime 
requires a common perceived interest, most power-
fully provided by a common perceived threat, and 
such threat perceptions are normally not permanent. 
Security regimes require an unusual level of restraint 
in their members, who expect gains to flow from their 
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cooperation and who are motivated to avoid the costs 
that defection would bring. Collaboration needs trust 
and the restraint of competitive behavior, and this is 
hard to forge, given the uncertainties of detecting what 
others are doing—why they seek arms, the difficulties 
of predicting who allies and enemies will be, and the 
suspicion that other members of the concert will cheat. 
Ironically, by reducing fear and suspicion, promoting 
cooperation, and lessening the security dilemma, such 
regimes may contain the seeds of their own failure 
by encouraging states to push harder for individual 
gain, behave competitively, and thereby erode the 
regime itself.65
The 19th-century European concert is hardly an 
exact parallel to today. As some have observed, it was 
hammered out from a common original crisis (the 
Napoleonic wars), a common European elite diplo-
matic culture, a shared fear of revolution, and rough 
power parity between members of the concert. Today, 
we are arguably dealing with disparate cultures, not 
bound together by the same fear of revolution, with 
power parities possibly shifting rapidly.66 But in other 
ways, conditions could be ripe for a power-sharing 
agreement. As already shown, both defense-dominant 
military technology and delicate economic relation-
ships in a mercantile age would make it prudent to 
negotiate an arrangement for reciprocal restraint. In 
addition, while there is no common political specter 
such as mass revolution, or a common national adver-
sary such as a resurgent Napoleonic France, there are 
common areas of material interest—indeed, threats to 
the global commons—that could be the focal point and 
source of motivation. These include nonproliferation 
and the prevention of nonstate actors obtaining WMD 
and the securing of loose nuclear materials, energy 
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security, natural disasters, diseases, and epidemics. 
In addition to these common areas, the major states 
in the world are faced with a global financial crisis in 
which they cannot afford the major consumer market 
of America to fail too quickly or too deeply. 
The most discouraging difference between the 
19th-century example and today’s conditions lies in 
the different configurations of power. The concert 
of Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and then France 
contained states that were much more closely compa-
rable in terms of military-strategic might than, say, the 
United States and its potential concert partners today. 
Moreover, they were exhausted by an epochal war 
and disenthralled from further conflict. The Congress 
of Vienna in 1815 represented the collective effort to 
address a common problem and forge a broader sense 
of an international interest. Opinion in Washington 
may well resist the suggestion that the United States 
should allow for a rebalancing of power in the medi-
um-term future. For proponents of a modern-day 
concert of India, Russia, China, America, and some 
combination of European states, the strongest coun-
terargument would be that the shift of wealth from 
West to East (if it continues) will bring these states 
closer to rough parity. 
To bolster such an arrangement with deeper levels 
of trust, it would be desirable to intensify diplomatic 
communication and dialogue. A concert today, like its 
19th century antecedent, pivots on horse trading, com-
promise, and ongoing negotiation. It therefore should 
work as an informal arrangement rather than rely on a 
formal institutional architecture.67 A shared sense of a 
European, Gulf, and Asia-Pacific security community 
would be useful. Even if this were unrealistic, con-
certs on a day-to-day basis require a lot of diplomatic 
spadework. To maintain a collaborative order based 
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on mutual restraint and trust would need a great deal 
of summitry as well as lower-level communication. 
As the final section will argue, stepped-up diplomacy 
would need greater investment and resources. 
The most difficult, possibly the most fatal, obstacle 
to forging a security regime is that it is easily carica-
tured. It would be crudely accused of representing 
“appeasement.” In American (and Australian) dip-
lomatic history, this is a strong and enduring mytho-
logical theme.68 Making concessions and granting 
strategic space to Russia or China, it is argued, would 
repeat the strategic and moral errors of British Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain, whose misguided 
diplomacy whetted the appetite of the predator Hitler, 
with disastrous results. In political life, many efforts 
at compromise or concession, or even the very act of 
talking to other states, have drawn this accusation. 
The appeasement slur traffics on a simplistic reading 
of Britain’s complex mixture of rearmament, adjust-
ment, and compromise in the deteriorating strategic 
environment of the late-1930s, builds its “timeless” 
argument on an atypical historical case, and ignores 
contrary cases in which prudent negotiation has suc-
ceeded (such as President Ronald Reagan’s arms 
control talks with the General Secretary of the Soviet 
Union Mikhail Gorbachev). The slur also ignores cases 
in which inflexible escalation and the obsession with 
looking strong has led to overstretch and disaster 
(such as the Suez or Vietnam).69 In any event, a secu-
rity regime is not the same thing as appeasement. It is 
an informal arrangement for bargaining, not a method 
for endlessly capitulating to one aggressor in the hope 
that it will be satiated. The concert carries with it the 
potential for counterbalancing against defectors and 
aggressive revisionist powers. 
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There is an important and unsettled question of 
when precisely that negotiated order should see itself 
as threatened, and how much other states should 
actively counterbalance against one member. As 
Stephen Walt acknowledges, the United States, par-
ticularly in East Asia, faces the “Goldilocks” problem: 
how to get diplomacy “just right,” neither too hot and 
antagonistic, thereby overburdening America’s pow-
er, intensifying competition, and strengthening the 
hardliners of potentially adversary nations; nor “too 
cold,” tempting its Asian partners either to escalate 
their own balancing behavior to dangerous levels, or 
even bandwagoning and creating precisely the kind 
of regional imbalance America fears.70 Where and 
how to draw such lines is the subject of the next and 
final section. 
Even when allowing for the more incisive criti-
cisms of Concert-Balance strategies, current condi-
tions in some important respects would be conducive 
to such a strategic shift. Four converging trends make 
possible a sober reappraisal of America’s position, at 
least toward a major retrenchment, and beyond that, 
a substantive shift in grand strategy. These factors 
are the reluctance of potential coalition members to 
take part in unbridled competition; the advantages 
of defending and deterring; transnational problems 
requiring collaborative efforts from great powers; and 
“hegemony fatigue” among the American people. 
The Lack of Appetite for Unbridled Competition.
Two recent incidents suggest that when faced 
with the real prospect of it, states have little appetite 
for unbridled competition. The first was the abortive 
“quadrilateral” initiative of 2007, when U.S. Vice-
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President Cheney and Japanese Prime Minister Abe 
attempted to introduce India into the three-way dia-
logue of Australia, Japan, and the United States, lead-
ing to large joint military exercises. Beijing responded 
by issuing threats and formally protesting against 
what it regarded as a “small NATO” forming against 
it. In turn, India and Australia stepped back from the 
initiative, for fear of their counterbalancing efforts 
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy that would turn 
China into a committed enemy. States that might have 
formed part of a coalition to contain another state (like 
China) instead balked at the prospect of a prematurely 
hard-line containment strategy, in effect choosing to 
develop their own military capabilities and develop 
bilateral security arrangements while waiting to see 
how China’s peaceful rise would take shape.71 This 
suggests that the notion of a loose Western bloc exist-
ing as a counterbalancing force in being may be more 
fragile and reluctant than some expect.72 Australian 
Prime Minister Gillard has resumed this dialogue, but 
also insists that Canberra’s goal is not to contain China. 
These two impulses—to accommodate a rising China 
while hedging against any threats it might pose—rep-
licate the two principles of a Concert-Balance strategy. 
The second revealing incident occurred in Septem-
ber 2010, when a Chinese trawler and a Japanese patrol 
ship collided near a contested island. After a Japanese 
patrol arrested the trawler captain, China demanded 
his release and an apology. China then halted the 
export of rare earth metals to Japan, threatening to 
cripple Japanese manufacturers, because Japan is reli-
ant on these metals for making electronics and hybrid 
automobiles. Japan retaliated, promptly devaluing the 
yen in currency markets, dropping it 3 percent against 
the Chinese yuan. A destructive trade and currency 
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war loomed. Both sides had a taste of a spiraling trade 
and currency war, and stepped back from the brink.73 
These two incidents point to a broader issue, that in 
these mercantile times, international relations are too 
fragile for an all-out contest for supremacy between a 
U.S.-led coalition and China. States are demonstrably 
willing to compete within limits, to build up military 
capabilities, court allies and partners, make claims on 
scarce resources, and generally jostle for advantage. 
However, thus far, states have proven to be nervous 
when disputes escalate. Assembling a coalition to con-
tain China too intensively could trigger crises, not least 
because China holds hundreds of billions of dollars 
in U.S. debt that could be dropped onto the market. 
America might find its allies distancing themselves 
when the hard costs of unmitigated competition focus 
their minds.
Thus, any viable U.S. strategy that a coalition 
would buy into must straddle the delicate balance 
between a self-defeating containment strategy and an 
excessive withdrawal leading to power vacuums. As 
Gordon defines the dilemma: 
concede too much ‘strategic space’ to China too eas-
ily, and Beijing might simply assume weakness; form a 
coherent strategy for collectively balancing China and 
Beijing might be alienated and pushed into something 
akin to a new ‘cold war’.74 
This desire to balance competition with strate-
gic cooperation is hardly a guarantee against future 
armed conflict. However, it does suggest that a 
middle-ground strategy is a better fit with the current 
diplomatic and economic pattern.
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The Defender’s Advantage.
In addition to the reluctance of regional powers to 
engage in all-out competition, there is a military-stra-
tegic basis for a more collaborative order, namely, the 
relative difficulty and high costs of attack and coer-
cion and the relative ease of defending and deterring. 
Historically, the dynamic competition between sword 
and shield is never-ending. As things stand, however, 
the defender’s advantage, at least in theory, offers a 
sound reason for maintaining good political relations 
among the major states.75
The lethality, accuracy, and range of modern 
weapons, combined with the nuclear deterrent, make 
expansionism and military adventurism more costly 
and difficult than ever.76 Technological innovations 
since 1945, such as intercontinental missiles and 
nuclear weapons proliferation, clearly have a shrink-
ing effect in terms of the projection of sheer offensive 
power, but strategically they also have a widening 
effect, making it very difficult to translate violence 
into military expansion against well-defended states. 
Nuclear weapons make the conquest of any state 
prohibitively expensive. The United States (and soon 
China) will have effective deterrent forces with secure 
second-strike capabilities. Defending states with 
secure second-strike ability to retaliate can devastate 
aggressor forces even with only a few punitive strikes. 
Nuclear weapons may not deter limited wars or all-
out nuclear exchange, and accident or misperception 
can take states to the brink of catastrophe. But they 
constrain the capacity of aggressors to expand. Other 
innovations such as ballistic and cruise missiles, satel-
lites, and information technology confer on defending 
states a pre-targeting and long-range strike capability, 
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enabling them to inflict severe damage on expedition-
ary forces operating from forward bases. 
Several caveats are warranted here. The rising costs 
of war do not necessarily make major war obsolete, 
as miscalculation and accident can intervene. They do 
not guarantee that states will not attempt expansion, 
and do not rule out wars undertaken for reasons other 
than expansion. States may misperceive their environ-
ment. The objective properties of military technology 
do not ensure that states will accurately perceive those 
properties. Defenders with a theoretical advantage 
still may not use their capabilities optimally. Weapons 
can be ambiguous. Even those intended for primar-
ily defensive purposes can appear to signal offensive 
intent. But in general, from the point of view of secu-
rity communities with much to lose, armed conflict 
has rarely looked so unattractive and unrewarding. 
We may not have seen an end to interstate war, but 
we may be witnessing an end to conquest in the case 
of states possessing minimal defenses. If major states 
cannot conquer and cannot be conquered at tolerable 
cost and if they perceive their environment accurately 
enough, that is one good military-strategic reason to 
look for ways to limit competition and co-exist.
Hegemony Fatigue.
One trend that could work in favor of retrenchment 
and a change in grand strategy lies in domestic pub-
lic opinion. Some primacists argue that the Wilsonian 
strain of muscular liberal crusading is the only authen-
tic American tradition in the Republic’s DNA. They 
object that American domestic opinion and strategic 
culture would obstruct any shift to a power-sharing 
strategy. The United States sees itself as exceptional. 
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It is the only historical case of a truly unipolar world 
power. Others (like the Romans, Hapsburgs, Mongols, 
British, or French) in some measure were accustomed 
to co-existing with other powers. But the U.S. foreign 
policy establishment has been reared for decades on 
the Pax Americana, an unusually strong domestic cul-
tural constraint. Some observers attribute a similar 
idealism among the American people, asking whether 
a more restrained strategy can retain the support of a 
democratic culture long drawn to viewing world poli-
tics as a Manichean struggle between good and evil.77 
According to Robert Kagan, this tradition of messianic 
idealism makes America a “Neocon Nation” that is 
historically bound to an activist foreign policy.78
This is both ahistorical and misleading in the pres-
ent. Consider recent empirical work by the likes of Dan 
Drezner and Christopher Preble into the gaps between 
elite and mass opinion on foreign policy,79 particularly 
in relation to the U.S. military-strategic posture and its 
diplomatic commitments abroad, the extent to which 
the United States should “burden shift,” and the extent 
to which it should play the role of “sheriff” or “global 
cop.” The evidence both analysts offer suggests that 
majority popular opinion is actually more averse to 
the current grand strategy of “leadership” than is 
often realized. Most Americans lean toward a focus 
on national interests narrowly conceived and toward 
priorities such as territorial and homeland security 
and regional hegemony, as well as protecting jobs and 
energy supplies. They support burden sharing onto 
other countries. Democracy promotion, human rights, 
or humanitarian peacekeeping—the agendas of active 
liberal internationalism—enthuses them substantially 
less. When it comes to the use of force, the Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs “found Americans think-
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ing about the use of force in the same way as offshore 
balancers.”80 They could be more receptive to change 
than elite opinion would be. 
More recent opinion poll data support their find-
ings. Recent polls suggest that Americans worry more 
about their jobs, their homes, their pensions, and 
health care than about export of American values or 
even dangers from abroad.81 Americans by substan-
tial majorities favor burden sharing, believe the Unit-
ed States should not assume the role of preeminent 
world leader in solving international problems, and 
that it is playing “global cop” more than it should be.82 
According to the Pew Research Center and the Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations, the percentage of respon-
dents who say the United States should “mind its own 
business internationally” has risen higher than at any 
point in 50 years.83 We do not have to embrace this 
absolute, isolationist message to recognize that these 
responses follow the logic that for America to do more 
at home, it will have to do less abroad. This is hardly 
surprising, given the interlocking factors of economic 
hardship and the lack of an obvious major adversary 
against which to mobilize. Emphatically, it is not un-
American to prefer a strategy that retrenches some 
commitments, minimizes conflicts, redefines interests, 
shifts burdens, and frees up resources for domestic 
investment.
Public attitudes differ significantly from the broad 
penumbra of the foreign policy elite, including mem-
bers of Congress, members of the executive branch, 
journalists and academics, lobbyists and interest 
groups, and the network of the most powerful for-
eign policy think tanks such as the Center for a New 
American Security and the Project for a New Ameri-
can Century. A diarchy of liberal internationalists 
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and muscular nationalist hawks places all other ideas 
under the shadow of a Wilsonian tradition, in which 
the United States has no choice to secure itself but 
to dominate and convert the world. Members of this 
consensus regard themselves as different—contrast 
the unilateralist swagger of the Bush II era and the 
Obama administration’s more consensual approach 
of stealth, charismatic uplift, and multilateralist mod-
esty—but these are arguments about the techniques 
of American hegemony, not the wisdom of hegemony 
itself. Both major parties have marginalized contrary 
visions. Those who argue for a withdrawal from 
global primacy are to be found only on the political 
fringes of American conservatism and progressivism. 
Important pressure groups, such as the defense indus-
try and the Taiwan lobby, reinforce the case for tak-
ing an adversarial rather than a collaborative stance 
toward Moscow or Beijing. So if the data on public 
opinion above are reliable, for a new grand strategy 
to take root, the most substantial shift would have to 
occur not in the minds of the American people but in 
Washington itself. 
PART III: MAKING IT WORK
In the world of policy, the most pressing problem is 
not to debate the paradigm wars of international rela-
tions theory. It is calculating how to make a change 
in strategy work, both in terms of winning enough 
consent to sustain it and designing practical steps to 
operationalize it. This section goes beyond the much-
debated question of the wisdom of retrenchment, ask-
ing instead how to make it persuasive and workable, 
given its many imperfections. There are several com-
peting models for a Concert-Balance strategy. Each 
of these models is based upon different assumptions 
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and theoretical premises. This section considers these 
models, explaining the trade-offs they would entail. It 
then offers a menu of practical measures that strategic 
collaboration or a power-sharing grand bargain could 
include. The section’s prime focus is on East Asia, giv-
en the growing perceived importance of the region, 
the focus Washington is placing on it, the apparent 
intensification of military-strategic rivalries already 
underway, and the dire consequences if the region 
were to erupt in the future.
I argue in this section that a new grand strategy 
should as far as possible aim to reconcile the need to 
retrench/realign resources and commitments, with 
the need to avoid, offset, or mitigate dangers flowing 
from partial or total withdrawal—primarily the unin-
tended escalation of regional rivalries—and to retain 
an influential forward role in shaping this more mul-
tipolar world. To cover its bets in this regard, as well 
as retain domestic consent, it would be most prudent 
for the United States not to abandon the region but to 
find a more restrained presence in it, becoming either 
an “onshore” balancer, or an “over the horizon” one. 
Defining America’s frontiers, its core and periph-
ery, is a perennial problem in its diplomatic history. 
It is never finally settled how to give geographical 
expression to its interests and to anticipating for what 
it would and would not bleed. These questions have 
nagged away at American policymakers ever since 
the Republic was founded. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson’s ill-fated attempt to delineate at the Nation-
al Press Club in January 1950 an American sphere of 
commitment and defense line short of Formosa or 
Korea, shortly before the line was overruled by the 
Korean War and President Truman’s expeditionary 
intervention into that peninsula, is only one of the 
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most glaring cases. During that crisis, domestic poli-
tics, alliance bargaining, the pulse of the battlefield, 
and Truman’s own rhetoric of a global war made geo-
graphic compromise hard to accept.84 Once America 
went beyond national self-defense into the open-end-
ed pursuit of national security, its defense perimeter 
became unclear and potentially boundless, an end-
lessly shifting frontier. There is no certain way to “fix” 
America’s interests definitively, even though ranking 
interests geographically remains an important (and 
difficult) exercise. This is why to achieve this difficult 
task, policymakers should look not only to the territo-
rial and geographic disposition of U.S. power (bases, 
allies, and forward deployed military forces), but to 
the full range of ways to share power and forge a col-
laborative order (a refocusing onto common interna-
tional threats such as nonproliferation, energy, and 
climate change; ramping up diplomatic communica-
tions between states and their militaries; creating a 
stable nuclear deterrence relationship; and neutraliz-
ing potential points of friction). If the ultimate goal is 
to secure the United States through an international 
regime of constructive collaboration while “hedging,” 
or retaining the capacity to balance and compete, the 
issue must go beyond where the United States stations 
its forces, and look to the kind of diplomacy it links to 
its military posture. 
Strategic Choices: Three Models of Retrenchment.
Hemispheric Pullback.
The most pure form of retrenchment would be a 
U.S. “hemispheric pullback” from East Asia and the 
Middle East, as well as completing the withdrawal 
from Europe. Having been a superpower with a glob-
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al military presence for 70 years, America would come 
home. In this model, the United States would extract 
its forward deployed military forces and terminate its 
formal alliance and permanent security relationships. 
It would restyle itself as an “offshore balancer,” shar-
ing power with growing and emerging states by virtue 
of its position as the dominant power in North Amer-
ica. It would reserve the right to intervene in extremis, 
namely, in interstate clashes as a balancer of last resort 
to thwart the challenge of any regional hegemon. It 
would retain the power projection capability to do so. 
This approach trusts in the natural power balanc-
ing dynamic that would kick in with America’s with-
drawal. Its logic is that by doing less abroad, other 
states would do more to preserve the balance of power. 
This would free up resources to do more at home and 
divert valuable resources that could be invested more 
productively elsewhere, such as returning America’s 
finances to solvency, investing in education or decay-
ing infrastructure, and reducing America’s depen-
dence on foreign oil. This strategy assumes the essen-
tial security of America’s own position. Supporters 
of this strategy see America as the most secure great 
power in modern times. With its distance and oceanic 
moats, its technologically sophisticated military, and 
its nuclear stockpile and intercontinental delivery 
systems, America’s territorial integrity is assured. By 
extricating itself from commitments in the Persian 
Gulf, America would reduce its exposure to the blow-
back it has suffered as a result of its geopolitical pres-
ence, such as radical Islamist terrorism. This strategy 
is closely tied to a desire to restore the integrity of the 
Constitution and republican traditions. By abandon-
ing military adventurism and dismantling its global 
hegemony and the national security state that comes 
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with it, there would be less reason to compromise civil 
liberties and create an ever more powerful “imperial 
presidency.” America could better influence the world 
through the power of its example, an idea that is also 
part of America’s heritage of strategic ideas. Accord-
ing to its proponents, a withdrawn America would be 
more solvent, more secure, and more free. 
The dilemmas this strategy would attract have 
already been laid out. Withdrawal could potentially 
jeopardize the credibility of the United States and 
its role as security guarantor, and it may be hard to 
balance credibly beyond arms transfers and finance. 
Without bases and permanent allies, active balancing 
would be more difficult militarily, requiring America 
to fight its way back into contested regions. The pay-
offs for this strategy would include a significantly 
reduced defense budget, a more free hand that  would 
reduce the likelihood of America being in the cen-
ter  of geopolitical storms, a reduced probability of 
“moral hazards” through which America’s patronage 
underwrites behavior antithetical to American ide-
als, and, in theory, an end to peripheral wars (such 
as Korea, Vietnam, or Iraq), and a reduced “national 
security state” with its constricting hold on constitu- 
tional liberties.
In terms of implementation and execution, propo-
nents have not as yet offered in-depth blueprints. The 
bulk of their critique of U.S. grand strategy and their 
alternative statecraft is oriented toward the “offshore” 
rather than the “balancing” approaches. Christopher 
Layne and Benjamin Schwarz recently, and Eugene 
Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky earlier, 
have suggested an outline of the “hemispheric pull-
back” version.85 It would mean leaving NATO and the 
retraction of forces from Europe, shifting to the Euro-
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pean Union (EU) responsibility for its own defense. 
It would mean ending the treaty of mutual security 
with Japan and withdrawing militarily from South 
Korea. It would mean removing most U.S. forces from 
the Gulf except for its naval presence in the straits of 
Hormuz. Not only does this strategy assume that in 
all these regions, a natural dynamic of power balanc-
ing and counterbalancing would arise with America’s 
withdrawal; it also assumes and accepts that there will 
be nuclear proliferation. Compared to competing stra-
tegic visions, this approach is relatively relaxed about 
the spread of nuclear weapons to states like Japan, 
Korea, and (hypothetically) Germany, though not 
about proliferation to hostile states or nonstate actors. 
Proponents of this strategy would even be open to 
assisting these states with building a second-strike 
nuclear deterrent and with command-and-control of 
their stockpile. In addition, the strategy would shift 
to the likes of India, Japan, Russia, and Korea the full 
burden of balancing China in its rapid rise, and balanc-
ing each other, except in the event of an all-out bid for 
expansion by one state. It would have America adopt 
a far more restrained, conciliatory, and nonconfron-
tational relationship with Beijing. This would entail 
abandoning attempts to promote democracy in China 
and declaring that the Taiwan question is a “purely 
internal Chinese matter.” It would mean cultivating a 
similar relationship with Moscow, partly out of recog-
nition that Washington cannot transform Russia into 
a market democracy at will, and partly out of reliance 
on Russia as a pivotal player in the power balancing to 
be done against a future EU superstate, an ascendant 
China or in the Persian Gulf. All this would be accom-
panied by a significant reduction in America’s nuclear 
arsenal, but with the development and deployment of 
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a missile defense system. Both these measures would 
be designed to erect a shield against “rogue” elements 
armed with long-range missiles or nuclear weap-
ons, while simultaneously reassuring other powers 
that America does not pose a threat. America would 
avoid the use of land power as much as possible, 
relying heavily on naval and air power and capital-
izing on America’s advantages of accurate, stand-
off firepower and its intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities.
In terms of implementation and pacing, advocates 
of withdrawal insist it should be done carefully and 
gradually, so that an orderly and well-sequenced 
withdrawal would give regional players time to 
adjust. America would assist the transition through 
arms sales and technology transfers. It would still 
conduct regular joint exercises and pursue close mili-
tary relationships with Europeans, Japanese, Indians, 
and Russians. The United States would seek a net-
work of basing rights should it need to reinsert itself 
in the future.
The hemispheric pullback strategy makes assump-
tions founded on a well-articulated neorealist theory. 
Its bedrock point is well made, that the United States is 
essentially a materially secure state, not easily threat-
ened existentially by other rising states. Because it can 
remain secure in its own neighborhood, it can afford 
to retrench and hand over responsibility to others. The 
strategy’s logic, as Barry Posen puts it, is to pursue “a 
coherent, integrated and patient effort to encourage its 
long-term wards to look after themselves”—if others 
do more, it saves U.S. resources, and prompts them to 
“think harder about their choices.” At the same time, 
this will require great finesse and gradualism. “A gov-
erning rule should be not to shift positions so rapidly 
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or decisively that altered regional politics open win-
dows of vulnerability or opportunity that either tempt 
or compel military action.”86
There are nontrivial risks that a “hemispheric 
pullback” would run if its expectations turn out to be 
wrong. Allowing for regional competition and balanc-
ing may result in intensifying security competitions 
and, according to offshore balancing theorists, may 
well involve nuclear proliferation. These develop-
ments may well not be as tolerable to the United States 
as advocates think. For obvious historical reasons, it is 
not clear how Washington could create more peaceful 
relations with China while simultaneously assisting a 
Japanese nuclear weapons program. The development 
of a Japanese bomb in itself, even one undertaken 
for entirely defensive purposes, would likely be per-
ceived in Beijing as a serious threat and a provocation. 
Even in an era in which states are reluctant to engage 
in unbridled competition, that could constitute a “red 
line” for Beijing, triggering preventive war. America 
would probably survive a Sino-Japanese war, but a 
clash between two of its major trading partners would 
mean that the benefits of withdrawal in that region 
may be negated by its costs. 
Conceptually, offshore balancing is not the same 
as isolationism. But it may well appear to be the same 
thing, and this perception could have consequences. 
It would conceivably be difficult to persuade allies 
and partners that by withdrawing, the United States 
would credibly act as a balancer and have their back 
when things become dangerous. It is also not clear how 
easily Washington could secure basing rights without 
a credible military-strategic presence signaling com-
mitment and reassurance. A purely “offshore” strat-
egy does offer a reduction in the costs that come with 
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American primacy, as it effectively hands over the 
costs of self-defense to others. It reduces the chance 
of being unwittingly entangled in a regional crisis. On 
the other hand, it also relies strongly on the balancing 
power of others. In the scenario in which the balanc-
ing of others fails, where a serious hostile imbalance 
does occur, whether in the Gulf or Asia, and where a 
withdrawn United States attempts to intervene and 
rebalance against a rising adversary, the costs of remo-
bilizing and “breaking in” could be steep, measured 
in blood or treasure. 
Over-the-Horizon Balancer.
The United States could opt for an alternative ver-
sion of Concert-Balance, as an “over-the-horizon” 
force. In this model, the United States would seek to 
accommodate the rise of emerging states to a degree. 
But unlike the model of total withdrawal, it would 
also maintain its presence in the wider neighborhood 
as a basis for potential intervention and as a way of 
constraining and deterring the rise of any one hege-
mon and limiting the fallout flowing from the new 
multipolarity. America would retain the pillars of its 
strategic position, maintaining NATO in the Euro-
Atlantic world and its alliance with Japan. It would 
recognize that the process of balancing may be slow, 
states may miscalculate, and nuclear deterrence could 
fail. The United States would be in a better position 
to “balance”—while still reducing its footprint—if it 
remained engaged. 
Balancing happens, but it happens earlier and more 
easily with a leader. Nuclear weapons deter, but why 
not place the weight of U.S. strategic nuclear forces 
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behind the status quo powers, just to simplify the cal-
culations of the ambitious?87 
Thus, the onshore version would be less likely to 
insulate the United States from a major interstate war 
(a payoff highly valued by “offshore” theorists), but 
more likely to retain a basis for influence and deter-
rence, and a position of power-projection strength.
Several commentators advocate some version 
of this strategy of making space without a complete 
withdrawal.88 On the basis that Washington ought not 
to go on regarding the Pacific as an American lake, 
these visions call for a new power-sharing settlement. 
For Walter McDougall,89 it would be akin to the Naval 
Conference of 1921-22, claiming that this is more 
feasible because there is no power poised to seize 
regional naval hegemony like Japan in the interwar 
years. America and China would essentially concede 
to one another “zones of control” that both should not 
contest except when under attack. The main problem 
would be defining where to draw this line. Chinese 
strategists have identified a first island chain, of Tai-
wan, the Korean peninsula, and the South China Sea, 
leaving the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and fur-
ther points east in America’s orbit. The United States 
could pull back further to a contracted “outer chain” 
of islands, perhaps covering Japan, Guam, and Oki-
nawa, as part of a defensive perimeter stretching out 
from Alaska and Hawaii. 
To execute this strategy would require some 
tough choices. To have any chance of successfully 
persuading Beijing to accept limits on its expansion 
to a defined zone of control, it would mean allowing 
for a process of Finlandization; that is, creating a new 
power balance in which small neighboring countries 
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feel strongly influenced to accommodate their policies 
to the larger one, becoming tributary states at least in 
the realm of foreign policy. This would mean conced-
ing any claims or involvement over Taiwan at mini-
mum, possibly in the form of a gradual easing of com-
mitment. It could even mean withdrawing gradually 
from South Korea and distancing from the Philippines 
as well. But above all, Taiwan goes to the heart of the 
Washington-Beijing relationship. China regards it as 
part of its territory and aims at unification at most, 
or predominance and incorporating it into its orbit 
at least. China has declared that it will respond with 
force to any unilateral declaration of independence. 
For the United States, Taiwan represents precisely 
the kind of second-order commitment that could 
become a basis for escalation and war, but also one 
which could be liquidated in order to purchase a more 
stable coexistence. 
How well could America live with uncontested 
Chinese dominance of its “near abroad”? According to 
advocates of this strategy, a superior American navy 
with its friends beyond the first island chain, and an 
Indian navy and friends beyond the Straits of Malacca, 
would be positioned to “keep China honest.” Critics 
claim that this would be the equivalent of a “Munich 
moment” of disastrous appeasement. Taiwan repre-
sents the most difficult and ideologically unsettling 
aspect of sharing power. Not to put too fine a point 
on it, but even if this is done as a gradual easing of 
the commitment, it would amount to an abandonment 
of Taipai by Washington. Would this moral and stra-
tegic compromise be worth it in order to purchase a 
wider regional peace? There is at least a strong case 
that the fate of millions in Asia and the United States 
should not be held hostage to the question of China’s 
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sovereignty claims to a territory. In addition, accept-
ing the movement of Taiwan into China’s orbit would 
be in accord with Taiwan’s recent “second détente” 
and its conscious policy of Finlandization, or making 
concessions to a larger neighbor in order to preserve 
a degree of independence and enjoy the benefits and 
added security that closer ties would bring. Far from 
betraying an ally, conceding this change would be 
in line with that ally’s own democratic will, its pre-
ferred strategy of demilitarizing the Taiwan Straits 
issue. This may help to dampen China’s sense of inse-
curity, which has fueled its own military buildup by 
removing a potential strategic menace from its East 
Asian shipping lanes. It may help purchase Chinese 
cooperation in other areas where both Washington 
and Beijing have common interests, from interna-
tional finance to nonproliferation.90 With regard to 
the “Munich” charge, it is not clear that Beijing has an 
appetite for limitless expansion, or that China’s strate-
gy of “peaceful rise” is comparable to that of the Third 
Reich. Even if it is, now or in the future, conditions are 
not promising for a would-be conqueror. East Asia is 
not a power vacuum open to the predations of a single 
aggressor like Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, but a 
region crowded with states developing their own for-
midable defensive maritime-air capabilities to deter 
and respond to one power’s adventurism. 
In addition to persuading a domestic audience, the 
most problematic aspect of a concession over Taiwan 
would be how to fit it into a broader strategic realign-
ment. Would it endanger America’s credibility in the 
eyes of its allies? Credibility is an ambiguous diplo-
matic commodity. Scholars are still at odds over what 
generates it and what threatens it. It may be that cred-
ibility is not threatened, and can even be bolstered, 
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by withdrawing from a peripheral commitment and 
refocusing efforts on more tightly defined interests.91 
But if this is wrong, and if credibility can be endan-
gered by concessions over Taiwan, it could be argued 
that the United States should guard against this by 
reinforcing its commitments to the likes of Japan and 
South Korea in the form of joint military exercises and 
a shift to a more air-maritime presence. This, however, 
would place limits on the retrenchment process and 
the benefits that would flow. 
What of the Gulf? The lion’s share of this mono-
graph has focused on East Asia and China, as that may 
be the nexus for world politics of tomorrow, and where 
America’s most likely and most powerful challenger 
may arise. But in the Middle East, the United States 
also faces the issue of how to get it “just right,” steer-
ing a course between destabilizing withdrawal and 
the status quo with its costs (the direct link between 
America’s geopolitical approach to Gulf regimes and 
the global brand of Islamist terrorism), and its poten-
tial future dangers (the simultaneous empowerment 
of and clash with Iran).
America’s main security interests in the Gulf are 
the flow of oil and, because of the resource bounty that 
the Gulf generates, the prevention of any single state 
from dominating it. This danger is less pronounced 
than in the past: There is not one single global power, 
such as the Soviet Union, that threatens direct ter-
ritorial conquest of the region and could harness its 
resources to empower itself and potentially threaten 
or blackmail others. Nevertheless, the United States 
also surely has an interest in the security of the oil mar-
ket as an important part of the world economy, and 
given that most states in the region are non-nuclear at 
present, one power’s bid for hegemony is remote but 
not impossible.
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As America withdraws its troops from Iraq, bal-
ancing by others is already evident, suggesting that if 
America does less, others may do more. 
Tehran’s stated intention to project its interests region-
ally through military or paramilitary forces has made 
Iran its own worst enemy. Iran’s neighbours are choos-
ing to balance against the Islamic Republic rather than 
fall in line behind its leadership. In 2006, Iran’s favour-
ability rating in Arab countries stood at nearly 80 per-
cent; today, it is under 30 percent. Like China’s neigh-
bours in East Asia, the Gulf states have responded to 
Iran’s belligerence by participating in an emerging 
regional security arrangement with the United States, 
which includes advanced conventional weapons sales, 
missile defences, intelligence sharing, and joint mili-
tary exercises, all of which have further isolated Iran.92 
Again, the most prudent course may be to act in an 
over-the-horizon capacity, finding a middle ground 
between excessive geopolitical entanglement that 
attracts blowback, and being missing in action in the 
event of an aggressor threatening the balance. Amer-
ica would thus have a difficult balancing act, being 
capable enough to intervene from afar as an anti-
hegemonial spoiler, for example, in turning back Sad-
dam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91, while 
removed to bases outside the region with its troops 
and pilots “off the ground.”
Other Paths to a Concert.
The above two models are territorial at their core. 
If sharing power is their goal, their method is to make 
room literally for an expanding China. But policymak-
ers should look not only to the territorial disposition 
of U.S. power (bases, allies, and forward deployed 
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military forces), but to the full range of ways to share 
power and forge a collaborative order. Apart from 
contracting its sphere of influence physically, the 
United States could look to a range of other creative 
power-sharing methods to give China recognition as 
a serious regional heavyweight in its own right, while 
still retaining the capacity to deter and respond with 
force to any threat to its interests or allies. These mea-
sures could supplement a territorial withdrawal and 
a shift to a “lighter footprint” presence. They could 
also be a substitute, so that if the status quo remains 
territorially, the United States could at least blunt its 
worst features.
One achievable step in this direction would be Joint 
U.S.-China military exercises and the enhancement of 
military-to-military communications. Admiral Sam 
Locklear, U.S. Commander Pacific Forces, recently 
spoke in support of calls by Indonesian President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for joint exercises. 
We should look for opportunities to bring China into 
these multilateral forums, so we can ensure that they 
can fulfil a role. . . [China is] a growing regional power, 
certainly an economic power, and I think it’s in all our 
best interests to ensure that we allow them to be prop-
erly integrated in that security environment.93 
This would be useful for confidence building 
and preventing a security dilemma. It would also be 
helpful as a measure of crisis management. Regular 
interactions and closer communications between both 
the United States and China might reduce chances of 
misunderstandings or miscalculations. Consider the 
incident in 2006, in which, after a Chinese submarine 
had a close encounter with a U.S. battle group in the 
Pacific, military commanders from both sides had 
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no method for reaching each other in an emergency, 
resulting in a 24-hour delay between Pacific Com-
mander Admiral Fallon’s communication and his 
counterpart’s response.94 
If the Sino-U.S. relationship is to go beyond bal-
ancing and become a concert or a “regime” in which 
both sides forego potential advantages in order to lim-
it competition, one opportunity for mutual (though 
watchful) restraint lies in the area of space arms con-
trol.95 China and Russia have called for a treaty to 
prevent a space arms race. As it happens, the United 
States and other space-faring countries are now nego-
tiating a new space arms control initiative.96 
Critics frame this issue as a question of the United 
States surrendering its military advantages and pay-
ing a heavy price for dubious gains. But the United 
States has a strong interest in preventing an astral mil-
itary competition. As things stand, it relies heavily on 
space satellites for reconnaissance, surveillance, com-
munications, and intelligence to sustain its military 
dominance. A more contested geography could jeop-
ardize this status quo if  it featured the development of 
asymmetric capabilities by America’s rivals, as well as 
increasing amounts of fallout from the arms race, such 
as debris from anti-satellite missile tests. If the Unit-
ed States has more to lose in an action-reaction anti-
satellite arms race, it could still be possible to hedge 
against future assaults on American satellites through 
alternative means, such as hardening the defenses of 
satellites and ground stations and maintaining deter-
rence through the ability to strike adversary’s ground 
stations, links, and missile launch facilities.97
For this to succeed, obviously other states would 
have to make concessions, for example, giving ground 
on America’s wish to prohibit terrestrial anti-satellite 
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systems. There would have to be sufficient verifiabil-
ity and transparency. As with security regimes gen-
erally, an arms control agreement of this kind would 
rely greatly on a roughly equal commitment to sustain 
it. It would be vulnerable to mistrust and to any one 
side’s decision to cheat or pre-empt what it perceives 
as the inevitable cheating of others. Mutual restraint in 
space would be fatally undermined if one side turned 
fatalist, believing that the world is inherently preda-
tory and conflictual and thus, through a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, destroyed the effort. Therefore, an arms 
control initiative would be difficult to sustain. But it 
could also be a prudent way to both forge a collab-
orative set of relationships while actually preserving a 
U.S. military advantage. By trading unrestricted mili-
tary freedom (and an ever greater offensive military 
advantage), the United States might be able to create a 
more benign, less contested domain. The alternative— 
an all-out race for space domination—may be more 
crudely satisfying, but an astral arms race could also 
lead to greater threat to U.S. space satellites.
A successful concert needs a level of stability. One 
indispensible element would be for powers such as 
Washington, Beijing, and Moscow to take steps to sta-
bilize their nuclear relationships. In addition to the size 
of arsenals, the stability of the relationship between 
powers seeking to deter one another is paramount. 
Two areas of self-restraint would be prudent: a halt 
to NATO expansion, and the abandonment of Ballistic 
Missile Defense. A little imagination shows just how 
threatening the expansion of NATO and the pursuit 
of a missile shield have been. George Kennan warned 
wisely in 1997 that NATO enlargement would be “the 
most fateful error of American policy in the entire 
post-Cold War era” and would antagonize Russia and 
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inflame its “nationalistic, anti-western and militaristic 
tendencies.”98 If Russia or China made military alli-
ances with states bordering the United States; if they 
subdivided America’s sphere into a series of military 
commands; if they erected a shield that threatened to 
make it impossible for America to retaliate against a 
nuclear first strike; if they could operate battle car-
rier groups within range of America’s borders—all 
while declaring the inevitable triumph of their own 
ideologies—the United States would obviously feel 
that its legitimate security interests were threatened. 
In response, the United States would take measures 
to counter these threats, and the relationships among 
the three nations would quickly break down. America 
is hardly responsible for all of China’s behavior, just 
as NATO is hardly responsible for all of Moscow’s 
behavior. But the regional supremacism, muscle flex-
ing, and coercion practiced by both does flow in part 
from fear. Russia’s support for secessionists and its 
war in Georgia in 2008 took place in an atmosphere in 
which Russia was continually humiliated, threatened, 
and provoked with the historically displeasing pat-
tern of Western power marching into its sphere. 
With respect to the nuclear dimension of Chinese-
U.S. relations, there is a worrying dynamic unfolding 
at present.99 Beijing’s capabilities are currently mod-
est, with only a handful of nuclear weapons able to 
reach U.S. shores. It fears that the United States could 
devastate its nuclear forces with a first strike, and that 
America’s missile shield would then prevent retali-
ation, notwithstanding American assurances that its 
limited ballistic missile shield is not directed against 
China. China’s fears may be growing, especially given 
that Washington now plans to improve its missile 
defense systems in the Asia-Pacific area. In theory, 
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if China’s fears were realized, that could mean the 
United States negating China’s deterrent and leaving 
it open to nuclear blackmail or worse. It therefore now 
pursues a survivable second-strike capability with 
intercontinental reach. However, in turn, this concerns 
Washington, as it sees China’s nuclear modernization 
as possibly a threatening move by a revisionist power. 
Once China obtains a relatively secure second-strike 
capability, the two states have a choice. They can pur-
sue open-ended antagonism and compete with an 
eventual nuclear war in mind, with the United States 
attempting to pursue the supposed absolute security 
that a shield would bring. Or they could attempt to 
negotiate an arms-control agreement and acknowl-
edge one another as nuclear peers, as well as open up 
a general framework for negotiation. At that point, 
rather than comparing the relative strengths of their 
stockpiles, the stability of the relationship would be 
critical. For acknowledging the legitimacy of China’s 
nuclear deterrent and abandoning the further devel-
opment of an expensive and difficult missile shield, 
the United States would ask that China forego any 
further expansion of its nuclear weapons program. 
This would not require either side to be naively uto-
pian in its hopes. “Trust, but verify” would still be 
the watchword. 
None of this means that America must surrender 
its forward deployed military presence and its capaci-
ty to hedge against mischief. It is no guarantee that the 
relaxation of military competition would be rewarded 
by reciprocal restraint from Russia or China. But it 
is surely worth a try. It does mean that America can 
afford to practice self-restraint in areas where the 
pursuit of absolute security has perverse results. The 
United States already possesses a secure second-strike 
capability with which it could respond to any attack 
with overwhelming force. From this strong position, 
America could avert risking a spiral of mistrust. 
There are several other areas that, taken as a whole, 
could cumulatively form a basis for confidence-build-
ing and forging a concert. Some would be positive 
areas of common action; others would be measures of 
self-restraint. One positive area is the nuclear fusion 
project ITER (originally known as International Ther-
monuclear Experimental Reactor), which is part of the 
joint pursuit of a common nonpolluting, renewable 
energy source.100 It already involves the major states 
discussed herein, as well as South Korea. In an era of 
resource scarcity, population growth, and an increas-
ing need for sustainable energy, this is an obvious 
area of common interest that will probably become 
more urgent. Weapons nonproliferation is another 
common interest, and an effort is already underway 
in the shape of the renewed international commitment 
to secure loose nuclear materials in the territories of 
the former Soviet Union. 
In addition to aiming for progress in these areas, 
the deeper purpose would be to extract a broader joint 
cooperation from the discrete measures. For example, 
by making concessions over Taiwan, missile defense, 
and NATO expansion, the United States would have a 
better chance of securing tighter Russian and Chinese 
support for preventing nuclear proliferation in Iran 
and even hammering out a grand bargain, through 
which Iran is granted its Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) rights to enrich uranium for civilian purposes 
in return for inspections and verification. Again, noth-
ing is certain, and American restraint may not attract 
reciprocal restraint. It would at least be prudent to cre-
ate opportunities and incentives for other powers to 
64
65
cooperate more and compete less. Should other states 
reject or resist these initiatives and choose unbridled 
competition, they would have much to lose. In that 
event, America would probably be in a stronger posi-
tion not only militarily but diplomatically, as the 
responsible superpower that offered others the chance 
for a more collaborative world order.
Though the debate about competing grand strat-
egies may often become theoretical, to make a more 
collaborative grand strategy succeed would take a 
great deal of hard diplomatic work. Critics may claim 
that Concert-Balance strategies are passive. But they 
would actually demand a stepped-up diplomacy and 
greater levels of multilateral engagement and commu-
nication, and all of that would need greater investment 
and resources. This would pose an added challenge 
to a nation accustomed to primacy and the diplomacy 
of an American Century in which Washington urges 
other states to play by American rules. If we are see-
ing the coming of a more multipolar world, that world 
would be a more negotiated universe, characterized 
increasingly by compromise and bargaining. If we are 
seeing a world of increased “balancing” and “hedg-
ing” by rising states, that too will require greater 
levels of diplomatic dialogue to prevent competition 
spinning out of control. In this respect, a more collab-
orative strategy would be more active than the current 
one, rather than less. 
The success of the 19th-century concert of Europe 
partly rested on the refocusing of states upon com-
mon threats, in their case, a common fear of the inter-
locking forces of revolution and major war. Are there 
sufficiently powerful common interests and threats 
to those interests that could be the foundation for a 
modern-day concert? There are transnational prob-
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lems that, if placed at the center of relations, could 
form a “glue”: weapons nonproliferation, energy 
security and supply, the security of the sea lanes, 
and resilience against planetary disasters. Above all, 
there would be the most potentially powerful pacify-
ing force of all, the common reluctance to engage in 
unmitigated competition. 
CONCLUSION
As this monograph has argued, given the possible 
future insolvency of America’s current grand strat-
egy, a program of retrenchment and a new strategy 
based on an acceptance of multipolarity and the limits 
of power is prudent. There is scope for such a shift. 
The convergence of several trends—transnational 
problems needing collaborative efforts, reluctance to 
engage in unbridled competition, the military-strate-
gic advantages (for the moment) enjoyed by defend-
ers, and “hegemony fatigue” among the American 
people—means that an opportunity exists interna-
tionally and at home for a shift to a new strategy. 
The ultimate aim of a new, more modest, and more 
collaborative grand strategy should not be to dis-
mantle America’s power, but to make it last longer. 
It would attempt a historically difficult task, that of 
forging a collaborative and mostly peaceful world 
order, while preparing for a more dangerous one, 
where the United States could deter and respond to 
would-be aggressors.
But a Concert-Balance strategy will still need to 
deal with several potential dilemmas. These include 
the difficulty of reconciling competitive balancing with 
cooperative concerts, the limits of balancing without 
a forward-reaching onshore military capability, the 
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possible unanticipated consequences such as a spiral 
in regional power competition or the emergence of 
blocs (such as a Chinese East Asia or an Iranian Gulf), 
and the hard task of building domestic support for a 
strategy that voluntarily abdicates world leadership. 
These difficulties can be mitigated, not least through 
creative measures such as the ones suggest above. But 
they must be met with pragmatic and gradual imple-
mentation as well as elegant theorizing, and the need 
to avoid swapping one ironclad, doctrinaire grand 
strategy for another. 
The move to a different strategy in all of its com-
peting versions would carry serious implications for 
America’s land forces. A “Western Hemispheric” 
version of a new strategy would probably see Amer-
ica’s land commitments retracted back to an outer 
island chain, gradually drawing down troops from 
South Korea, reducing the size of America’s forward-
deployed land forces generally, and positioning them 
as a more withdrawn and reserve force in the outer 
island chain. At the extreme end of the spectrum, the 
purely continental version promoted by some offshore 
balancing theorists, U.S. land forces would take on 
the role of being primarily homeland defenders. They 
would ideally retain the capability for expeditionary 
warfare beyond the water’s edge. As argued above, 
this would conceivably lower costs but pose consider-
able difficulties for America’s land, sea, and air forces 
should they need to fight their way back in to a thickly 
defended theater abroad.
The above judgments and proposals may or may 
not be flawed. But even if they are ill-conceived, there 
is a more important point that should inform the 
debate. It is that alternatives to Primacy should identi-
fy the difficult trade-offs involved in any grand strate-
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gic shift, and should anticipate worst-case scenarios in 
the event that their underlying premises turn out to be 
mistaken. The guiding logic should be to steer careful-
ly between the danger of the U.S. presence in a neigh-
borhood of growing giants leading to costly rivalries 
and confrontations, and a U.S. retreat that could create 
dangerous power vacuums and destabilize regions. It 
is time to weigh seriously the dilemmas and potential 
benefits a new strategy would present. Only then can 
we grasp what it means, and what it costs.
ENDNOTES
1. Jeremi Suri, “Where are the Kissingers?” Global Brief, 2010, 
pp. 32-33; Edward Luttwak, “Take me Back to Constantinople: 
How Byzantium, not Rome, can Preserve the Pax Americana,” 
Foreign Policy, November/December 2009; The Grand Strategy of 
the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009; Robert E. Hunter, “A New Grand Strategy for the United 
States,” Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on July 31, 
2008, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 2008; Daniel W. 
Drezner, “The Grandest Strategy of Them All,” The Washington 
Post, December 17, 2006; Jeffrey V. Gardner, Evolving U.S. Grand 
Strategies: How Administrations Have Approached the National Secu-
rity Strategy Report, Raleigh, NC: Lulu, 2004; Gary Hart, The Fourth 
Power: An Essay Concerning a Grand Strategy for the United States in 
the 21st Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; Robert 
J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2003; Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle Against Terror-
ism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics,” International Security, 
Vol. 26, No. 3, 2001/2002, pp. 39-55; G. John Ikenberry, “Ameri-
can Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror,” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 4, 
Winter 2001-02, pp. 19-34. 
2. I derive this formula from Posen, The Sources of Military 
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, Itha-
ca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 13; Richard K. Betts, “Is 
Strategy an Illusion?” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2000, 
69
pp. 5-50, especially p. 6; Paul M. Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in 
War and Peace, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991.
3. See Colin Gray’s development of this point, The Strat-
egy Bridge: Theory for Practice, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. 
4. “A Security Policy for Postwar America,” March 8, 1945, 
in the Hoover Institution of War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford 
University, CA, Albert C. Wedemeyer Papers, Box 90, Folder 
5, “Politics and Government,” discussed in Melvyn Leffler, A 
Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administra-
tion, and the Cold War, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1992, p. 11. 
5. See Colin S. Gray, “Harry S. Truman and the Forming of 
American Grand Strategy in the Cold War, 1945-1953,” in Wil-
liamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey, eds., 
The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy and War, Cam-
bridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 210-253.
6. On the issue of continuity and discontinuity in U.S. grand 
strategic history, see Eric Hamilton, “Redefining and Rethink-
ing U.S. ‘Grand Strategy’ since World War II: Some Historical-
Institutional Insights,” International Studies Association Confer-
ence, San Diego, CA, April 1-4, 2012; Melvyn Leffler, “9/11 and 
American Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2005, 
pp. 395-413.
7. Phrase borrowed from Joseph Joffe, Uberpower: The Imperial 
Temptation of America, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, p. 137.
8. Michael Lind, “State of Denial,” Salon, September 13, 2011.
9. “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-emergence 
of a New Rival’,” The New York Times, March  8, 1992.
10. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 39, September  27, 1993, 
pp. 658-664; as John Lewis Gaddis relates, “. . . President Clinton 
assured an aide in 1994 that Roosevelt and Truman had gotten 
along fine without grand strategies. They’d just made it up as 
70
they went along, and he didn’t see why he couldn’t do the same.” 
Lecture, “What is Grand Strategy?” February 26, 2009, Duke 
University, Durham, NC. On the continuity of strategy through 
the Clinton administration, see Christopher Layne, “Take Up 
the Slack: Is Grand Strategy Governed by Ambition or Politics?” 
Weekly Standard, Vol. 17, No. 27, March 26, 2012.
11. Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Fu-
ture: Why the United States is not Destined to Decline, Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 2012; “Falling Upwards: De-
clinism, the Box Set,”  World Affairs, Summer 2008; Edward Luce, 
Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent, New York: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012; Robert Kagan, The World America 
Made, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012; Carla Norloff, America’s 
Global Advantage: U.S. Hegemony and International Cooperation, 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Christopher 
Layne, “Graceful Decline: The End of the Pax Americana,” Ameri-
can Conservative, Vol. 9, No. 5, 2010, pp. 30-31; Joseph Joffe, “The 
Default Power,” The New York Times, August 20, 2009; Fareed Za-
karia, “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, 
No. 3, 2008, pp. 18-43.
12. According to one estimate, looking out to 2025, there 
will be an “unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic 
power roughly from West to East.” Global Trends 2025: A Trans-
formed World, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2008, p. iv.
13. Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of 
American Power, New York: Random House, 2011.
14. On theories of decline, their poor record of prediction, and 
the ideologies on which they can be premised, see Adam Gopnik, 
“Decline, Fall, Rinse, Repeat: Is America Going Down?” The New 
Yorker, September 12, 2011, pp. 40-47; Arthur Herman, The Idea of 
Decline in Western History, New York: Free Press, 1997.
15. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the ratio 
of U.S. Government debt to gross domestic product will be 100 
percent by 2020, a level economists typically regard as a critical 
indicator of possible default. See Congressional Budget Office, 
The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020, Wash-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010.
71
16. Greg Miller, “Global Economic Crisis Called Biggest U.S. 
Security Threat,” The Los Angeles Times, February 13, 2009; David 
Ignatius, “How Debt Imperils National Security,” The Washington 
Post, May 23, 2010; Ed O‘Keefe, “Mullen: Despite Deal, Debt Still 
Poses the Biggest Threat to U.S. National Security,” Checkpoint 
Washington, August 2, 2011, available from www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/mullen-despite-deal-debt-still-a-
risk-to-national-security/2011/08/02/gIQAhSr2oI_blog.html.
17. Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a 
G-Zero World, London, UK: Portfolio, 2012, pp. 11-12.
18. As Niall Ferguson argues in “Complexity and Collapse: 
Empires on the Edge of Chaos,” Foreign Affairs, 2010, pp. 18-32.
19. Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, 
Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1943, pp. 6-7.
20. On typologies of self-defeating behavior, see Charles A. 
Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1994, pp. 3-8.
21. As argued by Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. Macdon-
ald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to 
Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6, 2011, pp. 32-47, 
especially p. 40.
22. As Robert Pape suggests in “Empire Falls,” The National 
Interest, Vol. 99, 2009, pp. 21-34.
23. On the relationship between America’s support for the 
Gulf “apostate regimes” and the evolution of al-Qaeda’s assault 
on the “far enemy,” see Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The En-
during Conflict between America and Al Qaeda, New York: Simon & 
Schuster 2011, pp. 18–21; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global 
Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 
45; Max Abrahms, “Al-Qaeda’s Scorecard: A Progress Report on 
al-Qaeda’s Objectives,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 
No. 4, 2006, pp. 509–529. 
24. This definition is drawn from Joseph M. Parent and Paul 
K. MacDonald, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of 
72
Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, 
2011, pp. 7-44.
25. On this issue, see Henry Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.-
Chinese Relations: Conflict is a Choice, Not a Necessity,” Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2012, pp. 44-55; Charles A. Kupchan, How 
Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010.
26. For a critique of power transition theory, see Richard Ned 
Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, “Lost in Transition: A Critical 
Analysis of Power Transition Theory,” International Relations, Vol. 
23, No. 3, 2009, pp. 9-410.
27. “Could Asia Really Go to War Over These? The Bickering 
Over Islands is a Serious Threat to the Region’s Peace and Pros-
perity,” The Economist, September 22, 2012; Brian Spegele, “China 
Adds Aircraft Carrier to its Navy,” The Wall Street Journal, Sep-
tember 26, 2012. 
28. As Tang Shiping argues in “From Offensive to Defensive 
Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security 
Strategy,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: 
Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 141-162, especially p. 153.
29. Gary Roughead, James Conway, and Thad Allen, A Coop-
erative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, U.S. Government, Kis-
simmee, FL: Signalman, 2008. 
30. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions 
for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
1996/7, pp. 5-53.
31. Stephen Biddle, American Grand Strategy after 9/11: An As-
sessment, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 
Institute, April 2005; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the 
Cold War, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982.
32. For a helpful discussion of balancing strategies and 
their precedents, see Daniel Trombly, “Unpacking Isolationism 
73
and Offshore Balancing,” Fear, Honour and Interest, October 20, 
2011, available from fearhonorinterest.wordpress.com/tag/offshore- 
balancing/.
33. Michael Lind, “A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipo-
lar World,” Parameters, Vol. 38, 2008, pp. 48-60; Hugh White, “The 
Obama Doctrine: The U.S. Plan to Take on China Recalls Harry 
Truman’s Containment of the Soviet Union,” The Wall Street Jour-
nal, November 25, 2011; Power Shift: Australia’s Future between 
Washington and Beijing, Quarterly Essay Series, Vol. 39, 2010; Ste-
ven Van Evera, “A Farewell to Geopolitics,” in Melvyn Leffer 
and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., To Lead the World: American Strategy 
after the Bush Doctrine, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, 
pp. 11-30; Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, The Next American 
Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2008.
34. Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America Should Share 
Power, Collingwood, Ontario, Canada: Black Ink, 2012, pp. 128-
155; Coral Bell, Living with Giants: Finding Australia’s Place in a 
More Complex World, Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, 2005; Evelyn Goh, “The US-China Relationship 
and Asia-Pacific Security: Negotiating Change,” Asian Security, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, 2005, pp. 216-44; Amitav Acharya, “A Concept of 
Asia?” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1999, pp. 84-101; Richard K. Betts, 
“Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States 
after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1993-94, 
pp. 34-77; Douglas T. Stewart, “Towards Concert in Asia,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1997, pp. 229-244.
35. Christopher Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strat-
egy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing Has Arrived,” 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, 2009, pp. 5-25; Christopher 
Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 25, No. 2, 2002, pp. 233-248; Christopher Layne, The Peace of 
Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006; Christopher Layne, “From 
Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand 
Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997, pp. 86-124; 
Barry Posen, “The Case for Restraint,” American Interest, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, 2007, pp. 7-17; Brian Schmidt, “Offshore Balancing Yester-
day and Today,” Unpublished paper presented at the Interna-
74
tional Studies Association, March 2011; Christopher A. Preble, 
The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us 
Less Safe, Less Prosperous and Less Free, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2009; Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The 
Global Response to U.S. Primacy, New York: W. W. Norton, 2005, 
pp. 240-243; Doug Bandow, “First Among Equals,” The National 
Interest, 2009, available from  nationalinterest.org/article/first-among-
equals-2968.
36. Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” 
p. 112. 
37. Lind, “A Concert-Balance Strategy,” p. 59.
38. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: 
Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, New York: Palgrave, 
2008, pp. 10-11.
39. Robert Art, “Strategy of Selective Engagement,” Kenneth 
Waltz and Robert J. Art, eds., The Use of Force: Military Power and 
International Politics, 6th Ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2003, p. 317.
40. From European history, Josef Joffe identifies British and 
Bismarckian German precedents for “balancing” and “bonding,” 
presenting these as templates for 21st-century strategy, while cau-
tioning that America must also be a “builder,” because war has 
become too costly to be risked through overly hard balancing. 
Joseph Joffe, Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America, New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2006, pp. 127-157.
41. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New 
York: Vintage Books, 1989, pp. 357–360.
42. On this case, see Christopher Layne, “The End of Pax 
Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable,” The Atlan-
tic, April 2012, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-
inevitable/256388/; Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and 
the Experience of Relative Decline 1895-1905, Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press, 1989.
75
43. Samuel Huntington, “Coping with the Lippmann Gap,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, 1987-88, pp. 453-77, especially p. 457.
44. See Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organ-
isation, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1982, pp. 357-378; “From Balance to Concert: 
A Study of International Security Cooperation,” World Politics, 
Vol. 38, No. 1, 1985, pp. 58-79; P. W. Schroeder, “Did the Vienna 
Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 97, No. 3, 1992, pp. 683-706; R. Elrod, “The Concert 
of Europe,” in R. Matthews, ed., International Conflict and Conflict 
Management, Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984, pp. 411-20; M. 
Rendall, “Defensive Realism and the Concert of Europe,” Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2006, pp. 523-541; W. H. 
Daugherty, “System Management and the Endurance of the Con-
cert of Europe,” in J. Snyder and R. Jervis, eds., Coping with Com-
plexity in the International System, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1993, pp. 71-107.
45. See Dan Nexon, “A Quarter Baked Idea: The Post-Cold 
War Concert System,” February 11, 2012, available from duckofmi-
nerva.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/quarter-baked-idea-post-cold-war.html.
46. Robert Pape and James Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Ex-
plosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It, Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010. 
47. John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” National Inter-
est, Vol. 111, 2011, pp. 16-34; “Pull those Boots off the Ground: 
The Best Strategy for a Critical Region Is to Withdraw the Troops 
and Return to Balance-of-Power Politics,” Newsweek, December 
30, 2008.
48. See Peter Beinart, “Obama’s Foreign Policy Doctrine Final-
ly Emerges with ‘Offshore Balancing’,” The Daily Beast, November 
28, 2011 available from  www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/28/
obama-s-foreign-policy-doctrine-finally-emerges-with-off-shore- 
balancing.html.
49. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012.
76
50. Glenn Kessler, “Clinton Declares ‘New Moment’ in U.S. 
Foreign Policy Speech,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2010.
51. Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace 
China Conference,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, March 7, 2012.
52. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ”Re-
marks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” No-
vember 17, 2011, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 
office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
53. This has taken the form of agreements on defense rela-
tions, space technology, civilian nuclear cooperation, and the 
establishment of a strategic dialogue between the Secretary 
of State and the External Affairs Minister. See Mayang A. Ra-
hawestri, “Obama’s Foreign Policy in Asia: More Continuity 
than Change,” Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010, pp. 109-120, 
especially p. 115.
54. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees 
America: The Sum of Beijing’s Fears,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 
5, 2012, pp. 32-47, especially pp. 44-45.
55. For criticisms of Concert-Balance strategies and retrench-
ment more broadly, see Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Suprema-
cy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2011, pp. 255-263; James R. Holmes and Toshi 
Yoshihara, “An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indi-
an Ocean,” Asian Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-26; Michèle 
Flournoy and Janine Davidson, “Obama’s New Global Posture: 
The Logic of US Foreign Deployments,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, 
No. 4, 2012, pp. 54-63; Toshi Yoshihara, “Resident Power: The 
Case for An Enhanced US Military Presence in Australia,” July 
2011, Sidney, Australlia: MacArthur Foundation/Lowry Institute, 
Snapshot 9, available from www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Yo-
shihara,_Resident_power_SS9_web.pdf; Robert G. Kaufman, In De-
fense of the Bush Doctrine, Lexington, KY: University Press of Ken-
tucky, 2008, pp. 47-48; Sandy Gordon, “The Quest for a Concert 
of Powers in Asia,” Security Challenges, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2012, pp. 
35-55. The major theoretical alternative and basis for U.S. primacy 
in the international relations marketplace is “Hegemonic Stabil-
77
ity Theory.” See S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth: World Out of 
Balance, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008; William 
C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International 
Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 5-41, especially pp. 23-24.
56. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, p. 254.
57. Flournoy and Davidson, “Obama’s New Global 
Posture,” p. 56.
58. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 2012, London, UK: Routledge, 2012, pp. 205-302.
59. Paul Bracken, Fire in the East, New York: Harper, 
1999, p. 48.
60. In his words, “Like the recently ended Cold War, these 
future cold wars would be a blend of arms races, embargoes, and 
indirect proxy wars of the kind that were fought in Korea, Viet-
nam, and Soviet-era Afghanistan.” Lind, “A Concert/Balance 
Strategy,” p. 56.
61. Andrew F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military 
Futurist Explores War in The 21st Century, New York: Bantam, 
2009, p. 192.
62. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1987, pp. 147-181.
63. This argument is drawn from an ealier article by Patrick 
Porter, “Hooked on Security: Keep NATO, but Curb Its 
Appetite,” The World Today, Vol. 66, No. 10, 2010, pp. 12-14, 
especially p. 14.
64. One point of debate is the cultural dimension—to what 
extent was the concert underpinned by an evolving sense of the 
“common good” that rested not only on common material threats 
but on a sense of collective identity? Adam Watson, The Evolu-
tion of International Society, London, UK: Routledge, 1992, pp. 
238ff; K. J. Holsti, “Governance without Government: Polyar-
chy in Nineteenth Century European International Politics,” in 
James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance Without 
78
Government, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
pp. 30-57.
65. For more discussion of these problems, see Jervis, 
“Security Regimes.”
66. Problems identified by Gordon, “The Quest for a Concert 
of Powers in Asia,” p. 36. 
67. As argued by Carsten Holbraad in The Concert of Europe: A 
Study in German and British Institutional Theory 1815-1914, London, 
UK: Longmans, 1970.
68. Hugh White, for one, has attracted this charge. See Mi-
chael Danby, Carl Ungerer, and Peter Khalil, “No Winners by Ap-
peasing China,” The Australian, September 16, 2010.
69. See David B. MacDonald, Thinking History, Fighting Evil: 
Neoconservatives and the Perils of Analogy in American Politics, Lex-
ington, VA: Lexington Books, 2009; Jeffrey Record, “Retiring Hit-
ler and ‘Appeasement’ from the National Security Debate,” Pa-
rameters, Vol. 38, 2008, pp. 91-101; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies 
at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 
1965, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992; Christopher 
Layne, “Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Cham-
berlain’s Grand Strategy Revisited,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, 2008, 
pp. 397-437. 
70. Stephen Walt, “The ‘Goldilocks Problem’ in East 
Asia,” September 3, 2012, available from walt.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2012/09/03/the_goldilocks_problem_in_east_asia. 
71. David Brewster, “The Australia-India Security Declara-
tion: The Quadrilateral Redux?” Security Challengers, Vol. 6, No. 
1, 2010, pp. 1-9.
72. Such as G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power, 
Institutions, and the Western Order,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu 
Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of Interna-
tional Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 89-
114, especially pp. 111-113.
79
73. See James Rickards, “Currency Wars: The Making of the Next 
Global Crisis,”  New York: Penguin, 2011, pp. 41-42.
74. Gordon, p. 53.
75. For the literature on offence-defense balance and conflict, 
see Tang Shiping, “Offence-Defence Theory: Towards a Definitive 
Understanding,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 
2, 2010, pp. 213-260; Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defence, and 
the Causes of War,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 
5-43; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” 
World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1978, pp. 167-214.
76. See Steven Van Evera, “A Farewell to Geopolitics,” in 
Leffler and Legro, eds., To Lead the World, pp. 11–36, especially 
pp. 12–14; Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, 
Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge, Washing-
ton DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003, 
pp. ii, 3. This section is drawn partly from Porter, “A Matter of 
Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War 
Two,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2012, pp. 317-343, 
especially p. 338.
77. Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” p. 20.
78. Robert Kagan, “Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism c.1776,” 
World Affairs Journal, 2008, pp. 13-36; see also Justin Logan, 
“Beltway brigadier Robert Kagan is all wrong,” The American 
Conservative, February 13, 2011, available from www.theamerican 
conservative.com/articles/best-defense/.
79. Daniel W. Drezner, “The Realist Tradition in American 
Public Opinion,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2008, pp. 51-
70; Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Mili-
tary Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous and Less Free, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, pp. 10-11, 64-65.
80. Cited in Drezner, “The Realist Tradition,” p. 58.
81. In national polls summarized in September 2012, those 
interviewed consistently identified the economy and jobs as the 
most important issues, with only small percentages identify-
ing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as most important. “Prob-
80
lems and Priorities,” PollingReport.com, available from www. 
pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm.
82. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs sur-
vey of July 2006, only 10 percent of respondents wanted the Unit-
ed States to “remain the preeminent world leader . . . in solving 
international problems,” while 75 percent believed the United 
States “should do its share to solve world problems together with 
other countries”; 76 percent of Americans agreed that “the U.S. 
is playing the role of world policeman more than it should be.” 
Discussed further in Preble, The Power Problem, pp. 133-134.
83. Pew Research Center poll conducted for the Council on 
Foreign Relations: “Views of Middle East Unchanged by Recent 
Events: Public Remains Wary of Global Engagement,” June 10, 
2011, availaable from www.people-press.org/2011/06/10/views-of-
middle-east-unchanged-by-recent-events/. 
84. For how the Korean War highlighted this problem, see Ste-
phen Casey, Selling Korea: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion 
1950–1953, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 205–
33; Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The 
Politics of Insecurity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009, pp. 124–25; Patrick Porter, “Beyond the American Centu-
ry: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943-1950,” 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 22, 2011, pp. 557-577, especially pp. 
568, 572.
85. Christopher Layne, Peace of Illusions, pp. 186-192; Benja-
min Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “A New Grand Strategy,” 
Atlantic Monthly, 2002, pp. 36-42; Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, 
and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Come Home America: The Strategy of 
Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security, Vol. 
21, No. 4, 1997, pp. 5-48, especially pp. 17-30.
86. Barry Posen, “The Case for Restraint,” American Interest, 
Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pp. 7-17, especially p.16.
87. Barry Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions 
for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
1996/7, p. 16.
81
88. Bruce Gilley, “Not so Dire Straits. How the Finlandization 
of Taiwan Benefits US Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1, 
2010, pp. 44-60; Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? 
Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, 
No. 2, 2011, pp. 80-91; Walter A. McDougall, “History and Strate-
gies: Grand, Maritime, and American,” The Telegram, Vol. 6, Octo-
ber 2011; Hugh White, The China Choice: Why America should Share 
Power, Collingwood, Ontario, Canada: Black Ink, 2012. 
89. McDougall.
90. For this argument in full, see Gilley, “Not so Dire Straits,” 
pp. 58-59.
91. See Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders 
Assess Military Threats, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.
92. Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, “Clear and Present 
Safety: The United States is Safer than Washington Thinks,” For-
eign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2012, pp. 79-93, especially p.88.
93. Mark Dodd, “Bring China into war games, says US admi-
ral, as maritime tensions unresolved at ASEAN,” The Australian, 
July 14, 2012.
94. John Kent, “US Warns on China Sub Encounter,” BBC 
News, November 14, 2006, available from news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/asia-pacific/6146520.stm.
95. On the debate in the United States over the weaponization 
of space, see James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Stra-
tegic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2008; Asia’s Space Race: National Moti-
vations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks, New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2011; Michael Krepon, Space Assurance 
or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space, Washing-
ton, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003.
96. As The Washington Times reports, “The initiative will seek 
to outline international norms for non-threatening behavior in 
space; to increase transparency among nations that use space; 
and to reduce the hazards of debris, such as the more than 10,000 
82
pieces of space junk left by China’s 2007 anti-satellite missile test 
that are orbiting Earth”; Bill Gertz, “New Space Arms-Control Ini-
tiative draws Concern,” The Washington Times, January 16, 2012.
97. Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military 
Foundations of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, 
No. 1, 2003, pp. 5-46, especially p.12 n25, and p. 20.
98. George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” The New York Times, 
February 5, 1997, p. A23.
99. As argued also by Hachigian and Sutphen, The Next Amer-
ican Century, pp. 197ff.
100. See Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “China’s Ballis-
tic Missiles: A Force to be Reckoned With,” The Wall Street Journal, 
August 24, 2012; Keith Bradsher, “China is Said to be Bolstering 
Missile Capabilities,” The New York Times August 24, 2012.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
and
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Author
Dr. Patrick Porter
Editor for Production
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

